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Spring 2015 (a season rather than 
a weather designation!) is an excit-
ing and dangerous time for crucial 
political negotiations. Four major 
negotiating arenas pose enormous 
questions to process analysis and 
deliver important lessons. 
The Ukrainian crisis has run over 
a series of ceasefire that have im-
mobilized Ukrainian forces while 
being broken by Russian and rebel 
forces.  It is a case of multiparty 
negotiations, with different parties 
participating differently. Behind the 
Ukrainian government stand the 
Western countries playing different 
roles: France and Germany are do-
ing the negotiating and the US is 
applying the sanctions on Russia, 
with some European support, in an 
effort to provide a cost that will level 
the playing field and create a stale-
mate propitious for negotiations. 
That point has not been reached 
as yet and so the two ceasefires 
negotiated at Minsk are selectively 
observed only in the sectors that 
are less important to Russia and 
the eastern Ukrainian rebels.  The 
US threatened to raise the cost 
during the second Minsk negotia-
tions by indicating it might supply 
some arms to Ukraine. But once the 
ceasefire was signed, without wait-
ing for implementation, the US, in 
its style, said it never meant it, and 
so the truce was broken and the key 
rail town of Debaltseve linking the 
two sectors of Luhansk and Donetsk 
was taken.  
Lessons: A threat and an agree-
ment are only as good as their 
implementation.
But if there was waffling on the 
methods on the Western side, the 
real question of even deeper impor-
tance to the negotiations is, What 
are Russia’s aims?  Are they fixed or 
are they a function of the reaction 
at each step, revaluated accord-
ing to the response the last step 
has gotten.  The Western aims are 
pretty clear, if flexible. They started 
with a desire to maintain Ukraine’s 
territorial integrity and to involve it 
in association wit the EU and possi-
bly within NATO, and were whittled 
down to the first, as a way to get 
Ukraine back on its economic feet. 
(Given the Russian mood, the con-
sideration of Ukraine’s (and a fortiori 
Georgia’s) membership was a dumb 
and provocative move).   But it is not 
clear whether Russia intends to give 
eastern Ukraine the Crimean treat-
ment (annexation), the Abkhazian 
treatment (protected secession), or 
the Belorus treatment (predominant 
influence over the whole country). 
And stepping outside the Ukrainian 
sector, it is not clear whether there 
is a larger ladder, going from the 
Caucasus to Ukraine to the Baltic 
state, who are members of NATO. 
Yet these two sets of unknowns 
about intentions impact the negotia-
tion approach: does the West seek 
to make an agreement on a stable 
outcome on Ukraine or on Ukraine 
as the central piece of a whole sec-
tor? Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov 
has indicated that Russia would like 
a territorial definition of relations 
along the new Armored Curtain. 
But is that a lasting relationship or 
just another step, and what would 
it look like (Crimea, Abkhazia, or 
Belorus)?
The Syrian crisis, suddenly turned 
into a major conflict where reli-
gious sectarian and regional power 
struggles have submerged an Arab 
Spring uprising against a murder-
ous regime, has constantly evaded 
attempts at negotiation in search of 
a ripe moment.  The end of phase 
one of the uprising could be marked 
by the failed non-negotiations in 
January 2014 at Geneva II, where 
the conflict was manifestly unripe 
and as a result the Free Syrian Army 
(FSA) and National Coalition of Syria 
Opposition and Revolutionary Forc-
es (SOC) were absent.  It was folly 
to call negotiations to address the 
Annan Principles adopted in Geneva 
I when the FSA-SOC was too weak 
and divided and the Asad regime 
was still unshaken in its belief that 
it could hold on and that its people 
(those who were left) wanted it to. 
Lessons: Negotiations called in 
the absence of a mutually hurting 
stalemate will not draw a good 
attendance
Since then, the vacuum of power 
and order created by the conflict 
lent itself instead to the rise of 
an authoritarian, dogmatic force 
of fanatics, the so-called khilafa 
or Islamic State (IS) and a three-
cornered struggle between Asad, 
the FSA-SOC and the Islamicists. 
The West, which had neglected to 
support the first group found itself 
allied with the second, which it had 
qualified as the evil enemy, against 
the third.  This time it is the West 
that is uncertain what it wants, or 
what it wants least.  Not only has 
there been a vacuum in the conflict, 
that IS seeks to fill, but also in the 
negotiations, as Russia in February 
picked up the challenge and called 
its “Geneva” in Moscow.  Again, 
FAS-SOC did not come, officially, but 
the bases of negotiations with the 
Asad regime may have been laid, 
EDITORIAL
 3www.pin-negotiation.org
    
www.pin-negotiation.org  3
5 GUY OLIVIER FAURE
 SHOULD WE NEGOTIATE WITH TERRORISTS?
7 I WILLIAM ZARTMAN
 CONLICT PREVENTION AND NEGOTIATION
16 VALÉRIE ROSOUX
 TIME AND RECONCILIATION DEALING WITH FESTERING WOUNDS
21 MARK ANSTEY
 NEGOTIATING CROWD BEHAVIOR
27 MIKHAIL TROITSKIY
 FOCAL POINTS IN ARMS CONTROL 
34 PAUL MEERTS
 DIPLOMATIC NEGOTIATION, ESSENCE AND EVOLUTION  
41 I WILLIAM ZARTMAN
 NEW PIN PROJECT 2015: CLOSURE: HOW NEGOTIATIONS END
CONTENTS COLOPHON
PINPoints 
Copyright 2015 PIN
PINPoints is the biannual publication  
of the Processes of International 
Negotiation Program (PIN). 
PIN is a non-profit group of scholars 
and practitioners that encourages 
and organizes research on a broad 
spectrum of topics related to  
international negotiation seen as  
a process. The PIN network includes 
more than 4,000 scholars and  
practitioners of international  
negotiation. The organization is 
presided over by a Steering Committee, 
which organizes its many activities and 
edits the PINPoints. 
PIN is a project of the Netherlands 
Institute of International Relations 
‘Clingendael’, a leading think tank 
and academy on international affairs, 
European integration and security 
issues based in The Hague. 
Issue editor:
Paul Meerts
Editorial committee:
Paul Meerts, Sander des Tombe 
& Wilbur Perlot
Language editing:
Rebecca Solheim
Design and lay-out: 
Symon Maks - www.maksimaal.nl
Contact
The Netherlands Institute of  
International Relations ‘Clingendael’ 
Wilbur Perlot, PIN Coordinator
Clingendael 7 
2597 VH The Hague 
The Netherlands 
T +31 70 374 6681 
E wperlot@clingendael.nl 
W www.pin-negotiation.org
STEERING COMMITTEE:
M
. T
RO
IT
SK
IY
C.
 A
LB
IN
M
. A
N
ST
EY
F.
 O
. H
A
M
PS
O
N
G
. O
. F
A
U
RE
T.
 M
A
SS
EL
IN
K
P.
 M
EE
RT
S
M
. M
EL
A
M
U
D
W
. P
ER
LO
T
V.
 R
O
SO
U
X
R.
 S
C
H
Ü
SS
LE
R
I W
. Z
A
RT
M
A
N
4 PIN•Points 41/2015
under new auspices.  The rise of IS 
may be in the process of creating a 
hurting stalemate for the other two 
sides, much as the rise of Hamas 
created a ripe moment for Israel 
and the PLO at Oslo in 1993 and the 
rise of IS may be having the same 
effect of the rival governments of 
Libya negotiating in Morocco.
The Israeli crisis reaches the 70th 
anniversary of the first negotia-
tions and still running.  There is no 
stalemate; Israel is running over 
Palestine and building on it; Pal-
estine is taking it to court.  Both 
policies are likely to spin out further, 
further angering the opponent. The 
interacting escalation is in full swing 
and has been going on for a while; 
by giving nothing to the Palestinian 
Authority (PA), Israel elected Hamas 
in 2006, and Hamas hardened Is-
rael.  Israel would have much rather 
just have a compliant PA subcon-
tracting security, but the situation 
was untenable. At some point, the 
tightening stalemate will begin to 
hurt but it can also strengthen re-
solve and lead to further escalatory 
actions, thus inhibiting the hurting 
stalemate. 
Lesson: Ripeness is subjective, a 
perception, but it has objective 
referents. 
An equalizing move would be a uni-
lateral declaration of independence 
(UDI) by Palestine, which would 
be logically consistent with the US 
two-state position, if the US were 
logical.  UDI is not unusual and was 
practiced by Kosovo, Bangla Desh, 
Israel, and perhaps one could say 
by Eritrea and the Republics of the 
former Soviet Union (and indeed the 
USA and other former colonies), and 
attempted by Somaliland, Western 
Sahara, Nagorno Karabakh, Eastern 
Ukraine, Transnistria, South Ossetia 
and Abkhazia, without de jure rec-
ognition of the de facto move.  It 
is therefore not an unusual occur-
rence; its success depends on its 
support by a strong power, prefer-
ably next door.  UDI gives the newly 
independent party status; it also en-
dangers any dependency relations 
and cooperation with the former 
suzerain and risks turning the con-
flict into an international war.  But 
it would be a game-changer, and 
that’s what is needed, new Israeli 
government or not.
But the Iranian crisis over non-pro-
liferation constitutes the pinnacle 
of these world events. Negotiation 
between Iran and the P5+1 (Big 
5 plus Germany) reached a head. 
For negotiations analysts it is an 
impressive case of how much less 
than what either side demands are 
acceptable to itself and to the other 
party?  It poses the basic nature of 
negotiation: Giving something to 
get something, and confronts the 
negotiators with the operative ver-
sion: How much are we able to give 
to get how much of what we want to 
get?  How much is Enough?  Sanc-
tions have ripened the moment for 
negotiations for Iran, and the threat 
of a bomb has long made the mo-
ment ripe for the West to negotiate, 
whatever says Israeli Prime Minister 
Netanyahu. The preliminary result, 
announced just before Easter and 
Passover, contains some remarkable 
principles and precisions and leaves 
many knots to be tied and holes 
to be filled by June.  The question 
remains, does it provide a lasting 
relationship or just another step? 
Lesson: Negotiations involve con-
cession, compensations and refram-
ing (construction) for the parties to 
meet, uncomfortably, in the middle. 
So stay tuned. The events of the 
moment are providing analysts 
with good illustrations of concepts 
and plenty of new questions, many 
of which have been included in 
the articles of this PIN program 
publication.
In the first article, for example, 
Guy Olivier Faure puts to forth an 
insightful analysis of the require-
ments for useful negotiations with 
parties that adhere to the “nothing 
but the sword” principle. In the first 
of his two articles, I William Zart-
man expands upon the importance 
of the levels of immediacy when 
looking at the role of negotiation in 
conflict prevention. Valérie Rosoux 
follows by similarly emphasizing 
the role of time, or, more precisely, 
when reconciliation becomes nego-
tiable. Mark Anstey elaborates in his 
article on what can be gained from 
the seemingly recent phenomenon 
of negotiating with crowds. In light 
of this ever so complicated world, 
Mikhail Troitskiy argues in his contri-
bution that symbolic references can 
play a vital role in facilitating the 
coordination among actors. These 
focal points can for instance be 
found in arms control negotiations. 
The articles in this issue remind us 
of the extensive use and usefulness 
of international negotiation. In his 
dissertation of last year, Paul Meerts 
defended his analysis and recom-
mendations on how to further this 
use and usefulness of diplomatic 
negotiations. In this issue of PIN-
Points, a summary is given of this 
dissertation which is now published 
as a book (accessible from the Clin-
gendael website).The Montenegro 
PIN Roadshow in July answers to 
the call for more research attention 
to the processes of the closure of 
negotiations. In his second con-
tribution, Zartman concludes this 
edition by providing a foundation 
for further PIN-research on how 
negotiations end and how this is 
actually determined.
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With the proclamation of the Islamic 
Caliphate, the new developments in 
the Middle East raises in the sharp-
est way the issue of negotiating with 
such a terrorist entity. Should we 
consider compromising with what 
many people view as an absolute 
evil? Are we not risking selling our 
soul in the process?  However, if we 
look at history, during WWII West-
ern democracies never negotiated 
with Hitler, but they did negotiate 
with Stalin. Furthermore, concerning 
the Middle East, it seems to be little 
realistic to consider that the only is-
sue to the extreme complexity of the 
intertwined conflicts in this part of 
the world is a military solution.  The 
US Secretary of State, John Kerry, 
has threatened the Jihadists to 
crush them. In fact, many could be 
killed but that will not deterred them 
from going on fighting because they 
view death not as something to be 
feared and avoided, but as glori-
ous martyrdom opening the road 
to heaven. In all cases, the point is 
not just to win the war but to win 
the peace that normally comes after 
through constructing a new balance 
in this shaky part of the world.
While denying they have negotiated 
almost all states negotiate with ter-
rorists, even the most unlikely states 
such as Israel. The norm seems to 
be to declare that there have only 
been discussions and that whatso-
ever, no ransom has been paid in 
any case for the release of hostages. 
As a matter of fact, this is not true 
and there has been negotiations 
carried out and money handed over, 
sometimes astronomical amounts. 
In reality, there is nothing shocking 
about this, except the fact that gov-
ernments are lying to their citizens, 
which is simply unacceptable in a 
democracy.
It is essential to negotiate with terror-
ists when there is no other available 
option because the point is to save 
human lives either detained as hos-
tages or potential victims of the war 
going on. The ethical issue should 
not address the type of negotiation 
GUY OLIVIER FAURE
SHOULD WE NEGOTIATE WITH TERRORISTS? 
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counterpart, for we believe that we 
cannot always chose with whom to 
make peace and that ultimately we 
should even negotiate with the devil 
if necessary. The real issue should 
be stated in terms of what we give 
and what we give up among our 
fundamental values. If no serious 
interaction is developed with the ter-
rorists, there is absolutely no chance 
to have any influence on them.
The recent events in the Middle 
East provide an opportunity to ap-
ply some of these main principles. 
The declaration of the establishment 
of the Islamic State in Iraq and al-
Sham (ISIS), a new self-proclaimed 
caliphate is the result of a double 
action from the Jihadists, a mix of 
guerrilla warfare and classical war 
along Clausewitz lines. Stretching 
from the Mediterranean Sea almost 
to Baghdad, it is a lethal and merci-
less battlefield where intimidation, 
hostage takings, killings, rapes, 
torture, amputations, stoning, and 
crucifixions take place. However, it is 
also defined by some as the dawn 
of a new nation reuniting peoples 
of two countries artificially drawn 
by Western powers in 1916 to suit 
French and British colonial interests. 
In such a situation and even during 
the current carnage, two types of 
negotiation opportunities can still be 
considered, one tactical and the oth-
er strategic. The tactical opportunity 
focuses on the detained hostages 
who are threatened with execution. 
The point is, once establishing that 
ISIS is really willing to negotiate, to 
discuss over the conditions of the 
release of the hostages. For the 
time being, this option has been 
conducted with a mitigated success 
and several Western hostages paid 
for this shortcoming with their lives.
The strategic option concerns the 
longer term. The issue is to re-inte-
grate the Jihadists into the peaceful 
community of the Muslims. It could 
be done in a similar fashion as it 
has been achieved in Egypt with the 
Jama’ah Islamiya (2) Such a task 
supposes a whole set of negotiations 
with the numerous stakeholders of 
the region and beyond, knowing 
that local alliances are complex and 
volatile, the interests intertwined 
and that the double language and 
ambiguity management are basic 
components of the current game. 
The Sunni jihadist organization aims 
to govern an Islamic state of a new 
nature because it cuts across the 
traditional colonial state boundaries. 
Backed by an extreme ideological 
determination, sometimes resulting 
in “nothing but the sword”, it keeps 
on with its successful modus oper-
andi of “enduring and expanding”. 
ISIS attracts numbers of Sunni from 
all over for the sake of defending 
the caliphate against the “crusaders 
and kaffirs (3) alliance”. One degree 
further than al-Qaeda, it governs 
territories and tends to be financially 
self-sufficient through the control of 
oil and gas, taxation, extortion, and 
illicit trades providing funding for 
services and assistance. The basic 
idea is to take advantage of the 
current chaos to present itself as 
the defender of the Muslims of the 
whole world.
Contrary to what President Obama 
and a number of American observ-
ers said, ISIS does not carry a 
“nihilist ideology” but a much more 
complex system of values. Demoniz-
ing the enemy is not a very effective 
way to approach any problem. The 
point before negotiating should be 
to develop an understanding of the 
motivations and history of the leader 
of ISIS, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi (who 
claims descent from the Prophet 
Muhammad), and his main advisers 
such as Abu Ali al-Anbari and Abu 
Muslim al-Turkmani. An important 
father figure such as Abu Musab al-
Zarqawi should also be part of the 
study.
As for the main stakeholders outside 
the region, another basic pre-requi-
site before launching any negotia-
tion attempt would be to introduce 
enough coherence in their positions 
so that they can have some lever-
age in the evolution of the process. 
The European Union must sort out 
its endemic disorder and overcome 
its helplessness. The USA is finally 
realizing that it was much more 
directly concerned than the current 
administration would have liked and 
is getting out of its indecisiveness. 
Russia and China seem to be mostly 
concerned with enjoying the misfor-
tunes of the USA and its allies. 
To negotiate with any chance of 
success requires building up the 
conditions that will enable the ne-
gotiation process to be started. It 
may also have required working on 
some transformation of the problem 
in such a way that the counterparts 
are not caught in a zero- sum game 
and that a real ZOPA (Zone Of Po-
tential Agreement) exists. It is under 
such conditions that peace may be 
restored in this part of the world.
(1) Faure & Zartman Negotiating with Terrorists. 
New York, Routledge, 2010.
Zartman & Faure.  Engaging Extremists. Washing-
ton, United States Institute of Peace, 2011.
(2) Goerzig, Egypt’s Gamm’a Islamiya: Change 
through Debate, in Zartman & Faure, Engaging 
Extremists, Washington, United States Institute of 
Peace, 2011).
(3) “Unfaithfuls”, meaning everyone who is not a 
Sunni such as Shia, for instance.
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Prevention is a paradox.  On one 
hand, conflict is a natural, important 
and useful element inherent in hu-
man behavior.  As such, it involves 
strongly held, committed, even 
existential motives from which indi-
viduals and states are not likely to be 
dissuaded. On the other hand, liter-
ally innumerable conflicts have been 
prevented from escalating to serious 
political contention and to violence, 
as a—if not the—basic component of 
the existing World Order.  Statesmen, 
weathermen and firemen, among 
others, continually talk of prevention, 
but live on the insufficiency of their 
efforts. Beginning in January 1992 
the first-ever meeting of heads of 
state and government of the Secu-
rity Council concluded with a call for 
“analysis and recommendations on 
ways of strengthening…the capacity 
of the United Nations for preventive 
diplomacy” that produced Secretary-
General Boutros Boutros Ghali’s 
(1992) pioneering Agenda for Peace, 
welcomed by the Security Council 
and the General Assembly at the 
end of the year. No one has yet been 
decorated for preventing World War 
III, which has not yet happened.
But most countries do have a national 
hero who refused to be prevented 
from leading a bloody, patriotic 
campaign for independence. National 
security through national defense 
requires (and is accorded) about 
200 times more to most countries’ 
budgets for military security than 
for diplomacy, the preventive and 
preferable alternative to war.  The list 
of contradictions about prevention 
could continue.  This article reviews 
elements in a forthcoming treatment 
of Preventing Deadly Conflict (Polity 
2015), by I William Zartman, with a 
focus on negotiation.1
Given the omnipresence of conflict 
inherent in human and interstate 
relations, prevention of its escalation 
into violence through its manage-
ment and resolution is a fundamental 
component of the post-World War II 
and post-Cold War System of World 
Order.  The functioning and yet-to-
be perfected prevention of violent 
conflict is not just a set of techniques 
for dampening inter- and intra-state 
behavior.  It is a set of norms and 
practices that hold World Order to-
gether and keep relations functioning 
normally and effectively, allowing 
them to move on to other, more crea-
tive and positive matters.  The system 
operates through the individual and 
uncoordinated activities of members 
of the international community and 
through their coordinated actions in 
I WILLIAM ZARTMAN
CONLICT PREVENTION AND NEGOTIATION 
1  See also the PIN book edited by I William Zartman, 
Preventive Negotiation (Roman & Littlefield 1996).
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international institutions—norms and 
organizations.  Were it not so, inter-
national politics would indeed be total 
anarchy, wasting all time and energy 
in unregulated conflict and unpre-
vented violence. With no authority or 
even coordinator to organize those 
activities and actions, the United 
Nations Security Council (UNSC) and 
General Assembly (UNGA) being only 
the tool and toy of their member 
states, states and non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs) have to do it 
themselves.  Thus is World Order 
constituted, with the prevention of 
conflict escalation and violence as its 
key function.
It is especially in regard to the pre-
vention of conflict over state security 
and territorial integrity that the World 
Order operates.  Were it not so, the 
anarchy of the state system would be 
expressed in characteristic wars and 
aggressions as in the European (and 
particularly Italian) scene during the 
Middle Ages and Renaissance.  Yet, 
as in other conflict settings, the 
number of escalated and violent con-
flicts is minimal compared with the 
possibilities of threatened security 
of one state by another. Exceptions 
are exceptions.  It may be suggested 
that nothing more complicated than 
cost explains the phenomenon; ag-
gression is expensive, more and 
more, and the results are not worth 
it, a common explanation for similar 
social behavior.
But there is more to it than cost. 
The development of formal and 
informal regimes regarding global 
security conflicts in the post-World 
War II world presents a fascinating 
record of tested understandings and 
tacit negotiations among the world’s 
leading powers, where mistakes 
had a potential for catastrophe that 
was repeatedly prevented.  A set of 
norms and expectations was estab-
lished in a formal system of World 
Order in the United Nations, upset by 
new developments and alignments, 
reestablished by informal interactions 
and implicit conventions, and again 
upset by new power realignments, 
leaving it in shambles without firm 
expectations to be again developed 
in action.  Despite these mutations, 
it illustrates the conflict prevention 
capabilities of even the loosest set 
of behavioral standards and expecta-
tions even among the most powerful 
adversaries.
The same effect obtains in regard to 
other types of conflicts moving down 
the list from high level state security 
to issues of human security.  Environ-
mental protection, ethnic relations, 
human rights, population displace-
ment, and even democratization and 
good governance are all subjects 
of sometimes intense conflict and 
conflict escalation but are general 
handled by accepted standards of 
practice and resolution negotiated 
among nations.  These norms are 
powerful means of preventing most 
conflict escalation in their issue area, 
although they are not impermeable 
and they demand continual negotia-
tion for development, refinement, and 
enforcement.  Indeed, the new norm 
about sovereignty, the responsibil-
ity to protect (R2P), begins with its 
first pillar as the duty of the state to 
protect its own citizens and moves to 
pillar two the duty of other states to 
help it in that endeavor, before going 
into the rarest and most controversial 
third pillar, the duty of other states to 
protect the first state’s population if 
the responsible state does not do so.
Diplomacy, writes Sir Harold Nicolson 
(1939/1963, pp 4-5) quoting the 
Oxford English Dictionary (see also 
deMartens 1866) “is the manage-
ment of international relations by 
negotiation.” Henry Kissinger (1964, 
2) wrote similarly: “Diplomacy in the 
classical sense [is] the adjustment 
of differences through negotiation.”. 
New challenges range from nego-
tiations on climate change, nuclear 
nonproliferation, and broadened 
trade to negotiations with rebel and 
terrorist groups, with interstate ag-
gressors, and with true believers on 
abortion and capital punishment. 
Two and a half centuries ago, one 
of the first encyclopedia articles on 
“Negotiation” began “In common 
usage, ‘negotiation’ means the art 
of handling the affairs of state….
However, negotiation is not limited to 
international affairs.  It takes place 
everywhere that are differences 
to conciliate, interests to placate, 
people to persuade, and purposes to 
accomplish.  Thus, all life could be 
regarded as a continual negotiation.” 
(deFelice 1778).
NEGOTIATION AND 
PREVENTION 
The role of negotiation in prevention 
proceeds through levels of immediacy 
of conflict escalation.  It begins with 
longterm prevention, then midterm 
gestation prevention, pre-crisis pre-
vention and then post-crisis prevent 
lest it happen again.  In each of these 
levels, negotiation has an important 
but different role because each of the 
levels of immediacy requires a differ-
ent role..
The Net of Norms for Longterm 
Prevention.  The accepted “way we 
do things” is the broadest and basic 
means of prevention and the basis 
of the fact that literally innumer-
able conflicts are prevented from 
escalating to violence.  Negotiation 
appears in the construction of the 
norms, in their development and 
refinement, and in their application 
to specific situations.  Many of these 
norms emerge from practice: we 
prevent territorial or ethnic conflicts 
outside and inside the state because 
we learn to live within our “skin” and 
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with our neighbors, and the cost of 
upsetting consensually established 
practice is not worth the any benefits 
to be obtained.  But in many other 
cases, these implicit consensual 
norms are formalized into negotiated 
sets of principles.
The striking example is the UN 
Conference on the Law of the Sea 
(UNCLOS) that took 12 years to for-
malize a change in the legal norms 
for the prevention of conflict on open 
waters. At the other extreme is the 
case of uprooted populations. The 
UN developed a code of conduct 
for refugees, administered by the 
UN High Commission for refugees 
(UNHCR).  However, it left internally 
displaced persons (IDPs) outside its 
purview.   Whereupon the Special 
Representative of the UN Secretary-
General Francis Deng devised a set of 
Guidelines for the handling of TDPs 
(Deng & Cohen 1998) and as the 
Assistant Secretary-General of the 
UN became a missionary on behalf 
of the principles, which were then 
picked up by member states and 
even, in the case of Africa, became 
formal obligations of members of 
the regional organization and part 
of the constitutions of some states. 
Negotiations are underway to extend 
the principles to cover displacement 
from natural disaster and climate 
change and to extend the right to 
non-refoulement to mean the right 
to remain in asylum, and then a third 
extended the entire concept to imply 
the right not to be displaced (Cohen 
2011; Stavropoulou 2010; Morel 
2012).
Process Mechanisms of “Early-Early” 
Gestation Prevention. Exceptional 
conflicts do get through the net of 
norms to the second level of imme-
diacy, “early-early” gestation preven-
tion.   At this point the focus shifts 
to process mechanisms to interrupt 
the course of escalation and move 
the momentum toward resolution.2 
The process begins with the devel-
opment of awareness of the danger 
of a conflict situation’s potential for 
causing trouble.  That awareness 
is the bedrock of any further action 
and it need be engendered early 
lest the gestation opportunity be 
lost; lethargic Western responses to 
impending conflicts in Syria, Ukraine, 
and Liberia in the early 2000s show 
the importance of early awareness. 
This involves the diagnosis stage of 
negotiation.  The second element 
in the preventive process is the in-
troduction of efforts to deescalate, 
while reversing the impending trend 
through both blocking actions and 
negotiations to buy off or warn off its 
continuation.
The development of a stalemate 
through these efforts is the third 
element of the process, to produce 
a ripe moment that is the necessary 
condition to negotiation, which often 
involves ripening before the me-
2  For a fuller discussion, see the PIN work, Escalation 
and Negotiation in International Conflicts, edited by 
I William Zartman and Guy Olivier Faure (Cambridge 
2005).and International Regimes (US Institute of 
Peace 2003).
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diator can proceed with a catalyzed 
negotiation toward management 
and then resolution of the conflict. 
Though necessary, the mutually 
hurting stalemate is not sufficient in 
itself and needs to be seized, either 
directly or through mediation.  In the 
end, the final stage in the process 
mechanisms, resolution, is the best 
way to prevent conflict escalation.  If 
the escalation momentum is handled, 
procedurally, without any attention to 
the substance of the conflict, it will 
return at the next opportunity; the 
threat of escalation should be used 
as the impetus for negotiations over 
the conflict issue itself.
Methods of “Early-Late” Pre-Crisis 
Prevention.  If the escalating conflict 
eludes the process mechanisms of 
prevention and moves toward the cri-
sis level of immediacy, these mecha-
nism may no longer be adequate 
but it is still not too late to make a 
last stab at preventing the ultimate 
explosion of violence through a dif-
ferent approach.   Three elements 
are crucial in negotiations at the 
doorstep of crisis.  The first is inter-
ruption: immediate, intense efforts 
are needed to stop the events in their 
tracks.  This requires focused and 
pressing negotiation by a third party 
to halt the self-propelling dynamics 
of the impending crash and give the 
escalating parties space and time to 
reflect and defect from their course. 
Secretary Kerry’s mission to Ukraine 
and Russia to prevent a direct inva-
sion of eastern Ukraine worked to 
suspend the crisis until further nego-
tiations could be conducted.
But interruption needs to be con-
solidated by further negotiation for 
separation so that the parties can 
be kept from irritating contact with 
each other.  Such measures, to be 
negotiated, include ceasefire that be-
come conflict management devices, 
neutral zones and military pull-backs, 
peacekeeping forces, items for dis-
cussion on a later agenda, neutral 
parties’ monitoring. among others. 
The third element stands somewhat 
in contradiction to the second under-
scoring the delicacy of the operation: 
eventually, parties must be eased 
into contact and cooperation with 
each other, with measures that can 
be termed integration. Pull-backs 
from a contested border must be 
complemented by negotiated agree-
ments on the location of the border 
and measures for a border regime 
that allows permeability and controls. 
This third stage comprises measures 
often referred to a conflict transfor-
mation, replacing the conflict with 
cooperation and interdependence 
between the parties.
Late (and Earliest) Post-Crisis Meas-
ures.  The course of conflict, often 
portrayed as a bell curve, gives a 
misleading picture of a conflict that 
disappears into the sand when the 
deescalation measures are applied, 
when in fact efforts to wind down the 
conflict and even conflict manage-
ment agreements merely send the 
conflict into remittance to begin the 
cycle all over again if they are not 
complemented by post-crisis preven-
tion measures.  Management implicit-
ly promises resolution, yet it removes 
the pressure for it. Implementation 
is the necessary follow-through of 
agreements on conflicts prevented, 
but it needs monitoring to make 
sure the agreements do indeed fol-
low through to completion. Prevision 
is needed to look ahead at possible 
recurrences and unanswered ques-
tions left over from the agreements, 
even when implemented, and is must 
translate into policies of reconstruc-
tion to cover the causes and wounds 
of the past conflict.  Ultimately, re-
mediation needs to be considered in 
order to fully heal those wounds and 
prepare for full reconciliation as the 
ethos of conflict transformation.3
THE ELUSIVE QUEST OF 
PREVENTION
In a world that is continually reorgan-
izing its life and penetrating human 
society to a greater degree than ever 
before, there is no end to new aspects 
of conflict that will be seen as appro-
priate subjects for prevention. As the 
world gets smaller and its population 
larger, the pressure to reduce anar-
chy and aggression mounts, against 
rising contrary challenges.
The Search for New Imperatives.  In 
the field of immediate concern over 
the prevention of conflict, it is the 
norms governing security conflicts 
that are the first target of new imper-
atives, as the first line of prevention. 
The international community has 
undertaken an extraordinary revision 
of the norms of sovereignty, through 
the doctrine of R2P.  The established 
powers of the West, the coalition of 
the sometimes willing, are the leaders 
of this revision, as newly aroused to 
protect endangered world citizenry; 
the emerging powers of the BRICS 
(Brazil, Russia, India, China, South 
Africa) rise in constraint, if not oppo-
sition, as defenders of the old notion 
of sovereignty as the protection of 
the state; and the lesser countries 
stand by as the grass that gets tram-
pled when elephants fight (Cardozo 
2013).  Norms of responsibility for the 
protection of people are not to be ex-
pected to be any more absolute than 
is the norm of sovereignty as protec-
tion of the state, whose debates have 
filled law books and commentaries. 
It is imperative that the guidelines 
for legitimate operation of the norm 
of sovereignty be further sharpened, 
lest the procedures for conflict pre-
vention themselves become a subject 
for conflict escalation. 
3  This is further developed in the new PIN work in 
preparation, Reconciliation as Preventive Diplomacy, 
Mark Anstey & Valerie Rosoux eds.
In a related area, the persisting 
appearance of collapsed states con-
tinues to pose questions over the 
responsibility of the international 
community in conflicts apparently 
beyond the cover of R2P.  By the third 
R2P pillar, the international commu-
nity has the responsibility to protect 
populations when the state’s efforts 
are insufficient in their responsibility 
for the need to protect.  But what if 
there is no state?  In 2014, condi-
tions in Libya, Mali, Central African 
Republic, Northern Nigeria, South 
Sudan, Afghanistan, Syria, Iraq Hon-
duras, Guatemala, and Somalia quali-
fied, and still others had struggling 
governments in charge primarily of 
the national capital area.   With the 
state in mush, there are no pieces 
to work with.  State collapse leaves 
not only large areas ungoverned, and 
thus open to all sorts of unregulated 
conflict behavior, but also rapacious 
gangs in charge of the nominal (and 
internationally recognized) state 
apparatus and also other nodes of 
power (Clunan & Trinkunas 2010). 
The nodes are busy and satisfied 
the way they are—in a pervasive S5 
situation, a soft, stable, self-serving 
situation.  When the hyenas ravage, 
even the elephants suffer. In state 
collapse, the state needs to be re-
invented, on the job, in a form that 
fits local conditions. To deal with this 
situation before it happens is a new 
challenge for conflict prevention.
Similarly, the conditions for the rec-
ognition of a new state need greater 
regularization rather than being left 
to an ad hoc political process.  Po-
litical process it will always be, just 
as the definition of statehood and 
the role of recognition has been the 
subject of long debates and longer 
exegesis, but states and movements 
should be left with a clearer notion of 
what they have to aim for to qualify. 
The condition that new EU members 
must be free of disputes with other 
EU neighbors was removed by po-
litical blackmail by Greece in regard 
to Cyprus, eliminating the most 
effective inducement to settlement 
of the Cyprus conflict; on the other 
hand the EU rule has been helpful in 
attenuating conflict elsewhere, no-
tably in regard to the Serbia-Kosovo 
dispute.  Intractable conflicts, as over 
Palestine, Kurdistan, Kashmir, and 
Baluchistan, need clearer norms and 
strong adherence to the norms (as 
indeed to the norm of non-conquest) 
by the international community as an 
adjunct of prevention efforts.
The attachment of Crimea to Russia 
after its detachment from Ukraine in 
2014, preceded earlier by the detach-
ment of Abkhazia and South Ossetia 
from Georgia without any formal 
attachment, brought to the fore the 
conditions for moving boundaries 
and transferring territories.  Cur-
rently, when a powerful state wants 
neighboring territory, it can take it, 
a reversion to an age thought to be 
past.  In the same year, the horror, 
in the West at least, at Hamas mis-
siles on Israeli territory and the con-
demnation of the occupying power 
as merely excessive in its response 
reversed the attitudes downward 
during World War II when occupa-
tion was condemned as inexcusable 
and resistance lauded.  The incidents 
highlight the fact that there is no 
mechanism for legitimizing territorial 
transfers, since Russian claims to be 
protecting Russian speakers and to 
be sanctioned by a referendum after 
the occupation vitiated the expres-
sion of public support as a justifica-
tion.  There has to be a better way to 
legitimize transfers and avoid abuses.
The conflict with nature over climate 
change has already posed a chal-
lenge to the development of impera-
tives for prevention. Norms govern-
ing behavior in that conflict may well 
be produced some day, for protection 
if not prevention, and probably too 
late. But immediate awareness and 
decisive action are becoming urgent 
(Edenhofer 2014).  Although seem-
ingly a direct conflict with nature, 
like earthquake prevention, climate 
change is really a conflict among 
causing human agencies over a reac-
tion of nature to their activities.  Here 
a change in attitudes is necessary to 
precede a change in normative struc-
tures, and the means will have to be 
found to pressure and finally perhaps 
enforce compliance in such an area 
of global cause and concern.  One 
way regimes are formed is by estab-
lishing an agreement among agree-
ing parties, leaving the outsiders to 
join as they will, as in the European 
Union, the Law of the Sea Treaty, the 
International Criminal Court, and the 
landmines ban.4  The path to multi-
lateral agreements, when blocked 
directly, can pass through partial 
or minilateral agreements (Chasek, 
Wagner & Zartman 2014).  As some 
states feel more and more compelled 
to take action and other equally com-
pelled to resist, conflict stakes rise 
and hostilities spread to other, often 
unrelated relations.
Other regimes involving the same 
type of conflict are in shambles, 
laying open the conflicts within their 
particular areas of focus. The nuclear 
arms regime show great cracks in its 
non-proliferation and test ban con-
trols.  The regime is a conflict pre-
vention measure, but in the process 
it is a bitter subject of conflict, which 
in turn risks destroying its prevention 
capabilities and opens the door to 
a number of new Nuclear Weapons 
Capable States (NWCS), particularly 
in a volatile regions such as the Mid-
4  On negotiating international regimes, see the PIN 
book edited by Bertram Spector and I William Zart-
man, Getting it Done: Post-Agreement Negotiations 
and International Regimes (US Institute of Peace 
2003).
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dle East.  Along side, a regime for 
the prohibition of biological weapons 
need be negotiated to complete the 
ABC (atomic, biological, chemical) 
weapons regime.
Another area of conflict prevention 
that presses for focused negotiation 
concerns conflicts over depleting 
natural resources.  Population pres-
sure (also exacerbated by climate 
change in tropical regions) raises 
issues over the land tenure system in 
much of the developing world, where 
traditional ownership norms conflict 
with modern legal systems, with 
no established practices on how to 
combine the two; traditional norms 
themselves are unable to handle 
clashes between tribal (collective) 
ownership and longstanding usufruct 
claims. (Boone 2014).  The many 
regimes governing the prevention 
of depletion of fish and wildlife need 
to be amalgamated onto a global or 
at least species- and geographic- or 
basin- basis, in the image that CITES 
on endangered species has created. 
Similarly, prevention is called for in 
conflicts over the depletion of water 
resources, where there are no norms, 
regimes or regulation to govern al-
location and contain claims. 
Information and Communication 
Technology (ICT) is a new double-
faced area of concern, both as a 
subject of conflict and as an agent 
of prevention (Stauffacher 2014; 
DeNardis 2014).  Cyber conflict has 
become a major arena of covert op-
erations among states, as a means of 
locating intelligence, as a weapon of 
disruption, and as means of security 
and defense. Its use as the latter 
justifies its use as the former, and so 
the cycle of conflict escalates.   But 
as a means of prevention, it is both 
a direct agent in the development of 
warning, awareness, and timely ac-
tion, and a subject of new norms and 
their enforcement.  Transparency, 
confidence and security building 
mechanisms (TCSBMs) expand the 
original focus on confidence building 
alone to encompass the whole range 
of regime activities into this new 
area, where the operative details of 
prevention remain to be negotiated.
Search for New Mechanisms.  A 
number of new mechanisms have 
appeared in recent decades—new 
institutionss of various degrees of 
authority such as the new Law of 
the Sea (1982), the Framework Con-
vention on Climate Change (1992), 
the Guidelines on IDPs, truth and 
reconciliation commissions, IAEA, UN 
SRSGs and PKFs (not provided for in 
the Charter), the International Crimi-
nal Court (1998), and the remarkable 
efforts of the OSCE High Commis-
sioner on National Minorities and the 
Conflict Prevention Center and the 
UN Assistant Secretaries-General on 
Displaced Persons and the Preven-
tion of Genocide..
The existing mechanism that needs 
most improvement is arguably the UN 
Security Council.  Repeated blocking 
otherwise consensual action by one 
or 2 vetoes is as much a derogation 
of the spirit of UN operating principles 
as is intervention by a single party; 
the use of coalitions of the willing 
to carry out needed preventive ac-
tions is a properly creative response. 
Reforms of UNSC composition are 
unlikely, but rules of procedure that 
would give the forum more flexibility 
could be helpful in enacting prevent-
ing measures (although not entirely 
likely because of the organization’s 
composition).  Other UN bodies work 
on a decision rule of consensus or of 
unanimity minus one, an extension of 
the abstention rule that could facili-
tate positive action.,
Imposed suspension (interruption), 
a standard mechanism for inserting 
at least a pause in escalatory spirals 
is used in labor disputes.  There 
has been much progress in slowing 
down the sort of sudden response 
and crisis escalation that started 
World War I, although the June War 
in 1967 was launched by a similar 
escalation based on false intelligence 
on both capabilities and intentions 
(Parker).  IAEA and OPCW inspec-
tions—and Comprehensive Test Ban 
Treaty Organization inspections, 
when the treaty is ratified5—are 
an important element in assuring 
atomic weapons regimes, although 
they need greater authority against 
tactics of sovereignty.  Had they been 
able to overcome Saddam Hussein’s 
ill-considered diplomatic games, they 
could have assured the absence of 
weapons of mass destruction and re-
moved the excuse—and possibly the 
initiation—of the Iraq War (2003); 
the same goes for North Korea and 
Iran.
Another mechanism for interrupting 
the spiral of escalation is the aware-
ness by the escalator itself that it has 
achieved some success and that it is 
time to pull back or at least to pause. 
Escalation can become a reverse 
entrapment, an end in itself rather 
than a means, with the escalating 
party unable to recognize when it 
has started to achieve its goals and 
can use its own reverse momentum 
to pull, rather than push, the other 
side to agreement.  The dynamics of 
the US sanctions campaign against 
Iran is an eloquent case, as is the 
Russian covetousness campaign over 
Ukraine. At the same time sanctions 
must stay in place until some results 
occur and not be lifted just to create 
a nice atmosphere. The debate over 
the partial lifting of sanctions against 
Serbia before 1998 is an example.
5  For further analysis, see the PIN work edited by 
Mordechai Melamud, Paul Meerts, and I William 
Zartman, Banning the Bang on the Bomb? Negotiat-
ing the Nuclear Test Ban Regime  (Cambridge 2014). 
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A difficult and daring mechanism 
would be the revival of the institu-
tion of trusteeship to help collapsed 
states (Ratner).  The odor of revived 
colonialism and the bureaucratic 
inefficiency of international organiza-
tions provide two narrow limits within 
which such a reform would have to 
operate.  The third limit would be the 
terrain in which the trustee would 
have to operate; it is simply daunt-
ingly dangerous for any agency, 
whether the French or American 
army or a UN trustee, to try to restore 
law and order in Centrafrique, Syria, 
Iraq, Somalia or Eastern Congo, yet 
attempts are being made..
Mechanisms of enforcement run 
up against sovereignty in the state 
system.  Enforcement of prevention 
depends on the constraints that 
states agree to impose on them-
selves.  Therefore the mechanism 
of enforcement lies in the solutions 
negotiated with attention to the in-
terests of the parties involved, either 
in specific outcomes to a conflict 
situation or in general responses to 
a type of situation.  Both depend on 
the reciprocity encased in the pre-
vention arrangement.
As prevention looks for new material 
to work with if it is to avoid simply a 
return to The Lord of the Flies, it can 
look most productively at traditional 
local customs for managing conflict. 
Traditional societies long developed 
their own practices and norms for 
conflict prevention and escalation; 
the community served to prevent 
conflict in the first place and provide 
systems of accountability and heal-
ing.  They have found effectiveness 
in Eastern Congo (Autaserre 2003), 
West Africa (Zartman 2003; 2013; 
Adebayo, Lundy Benjamin & Kings-
ley 2014) and Palestine (Abu Nimer 
2003).  When the problem is that 
there is no state to work with, in or 
about, the beginnings of answer can 
be to think small, at the local level. 
What is needed however is an exist-
ing community of some sort within 
which conflict prevention can oper-
ate to rebuild social tissue ruptured 
by conflict.  Community has been 
weakened by modernization, and if 
there it is any effort at a replace-
ment it is on the national level as 
state nations seek to become the 
forum for its functions.  It doesn’t 
work. The search for mechanisms 
needs a functional replacement on 
the subnational level that can up-
date traditional structures and func-
tion.  Efforts such as Infrastructures 
for Peace including both revived and 
refitted traditional practices and lo-
cal peace committees (LPCs) are an 
initial step that has been  adopted 
by the Organization for Security and 
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and 
promoted by NGOs (van Tongenen 
2013; OSCE 2012; Unger, Kund-
ström, Planta & Austin 2013; UNDP 
2013).  The next, and necessary step, 
is to link these grassroots activities 
to national governance systems so 
that they do not remain autonomous 
unrecognized feet separate from the 
body politic.
Search for New Agents.  Although 
the state is the prime agent of pre-
vention, it can benefit from multiple 
assistants.  A notable addition to 
the agents of conflict prevention in 
the post-World War II era is the rise 
of non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs) into an era that was long off 
bounds (Stein 2000).  In the vari-
ous issue areas and mechanism of 
prevention, NGOs have as active a 
role as do states.  Other areas, such 
as awareness and mediation, have 
seen a growing civil society role to 
complement state action with activi-
ties the state cannot perform as well. 
For the most part, states are needed 
to officialize processes and results, 
but NGOs can be singularly effective 
in smoothing ethnic relations, pro-
moting human rights, encouraging 
democratization, facilitating good 
governance, softening population 
displacement, promoting attention 
and attentiveness, providing media-
tory functions, and facilitation imple-
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mentation in sum, in working with 
people as opposed to with states. 
The most important qualification to 
be observed on NGO work alongside 
states in conflict prevention (Track II 
diplomacy) is respect and coordina-
tion.  Agency can only be public or 
private, but cooperation can take 
new forms.  Increased use of NGOs 
puts unusual strains on resources. 
Standby teams for diplomatic as 
well as military duty have been set 
up in conjunction with the UNDPA 
Mediation Support Unit, with increas-
ing success. The Carter Center’s 
International Negotiation Network 
(INN) depended on availability and 
proved useful on occasion.  Blue 
Hats, along with Blue Helmets, have 
been proposed to help post-conflict 
situation develop administrative skills 
on a shortterm basis; police (Blue 
Berets?) have been also seconded 
from national police duties to fill in 
in post-conflict situations and provide 
training. The Intergovernmental Pan-
el on Climate Change (IPCC) and the 
UN Academic Advisory Council on the 
Mediation Initiative bring private ex-
pertise to bear on conflict situations 
to inform professional practitioners. 
Search for New Knowledge.  Conflict 
prevention remains an exciting and 
relevant field for the search for new 
knowledge.  The uncertainty of the 
causal chain and the fallibility of fore-
sight have been highlighted from the 
beginning.   Better understanding of 
what causes conflict to emerge from 
its passive shell and climb the steps 
of escalation is necessary for more 
effective prevention.  Such dynamics 
as the security dilemma and entrap-
ment still escape effective interrup-
tion and remedy.  While new work is 
being done on why rebellions arise 
(Collier, A&Z) and why people en-
gage in them (Lichbach, Sambanis), 
the etiology is still not well enough 
understood to counter the causes 
and satisfy the demands at the same 
time; frequently the people are the 
ones who are engaging in their 
side of normal politics (articulating 
and aggregating demands) and the 
government that is waging conflict 
against them.
New knowledge will give better pre-
dictions; nonetheless, human beings 
have the ineffable capacity to do 
dumb things and practice inspired 
creativity, in addition to following 
studied regularities of behavior.  A 
study of political forecasting showed 
that experts were wrong 25 percent 
of the time when they claimed to be 
absolutely certain (Tetlock 2005). 
That means that were right three-
quarter of the time, an astoundingly 
high figure for an activity subject of 
popular derision.  It all depends on 
expectations.  New knowledge on 
data, regularities and prediction will 
work on that 25 percent, although it 
will discover new irregularities at the 
same time, and hopefully will reduce 
dumbness and increase creativity.
Prevention is a pressing concern 
as the system of World Order un-
dergoes sharp shocks in the early 
XXIst century.  The norm against 
conquest has been shaken by Rus-
sia in Ukraine and Israel in Palestine 
and the methods of interruption, 
separation and integration have 
wobbled. The norm against mass 
murder of one’s own population 
has been trashed by Bashir and 
Kir in Sudan, Asad in Syria, and 
the mechanisms of awareness, de-
escalation, stalemate and ripening 
have been left in the bag, unused. 
Ethnic and religious (often mixed) 
wars in Central Africa, Syria, Iraq, 
Afghanistan, Pakistan, both Sudans, 
Burundi, Thailand, and Ukraine 
have moved toward genocide. The 
non-proliferation, world trade, and 
climate change regimes have frayed 
at the edges with large loopholes in 
the middle.  The Cold War blockade 
of the UN security and preventive 
machinery by Russia and China has 
returned, bereft of ideology but just 
for reasons of power rivalry.  Conflict 
and security as world-shaping inter-
state matters have reemerged from 
the history files of the last century, 
alongside anomies of terrorizing 
gangs, sometimes with a message, 
sometimes without a cause, such as 
Boko Haram, the various al-Qaeda 
franchises in the Maghreb, Arabian 
Peninsula, Egypt and elsewhere, 
ISIS (The so-called Islamic State), 
among others, but also thugs in 
Honduras and Guatemala for whom 
prevention is as elusive as solution.
In this World in search  
of Order, there is a crying 
need to focus on  
negotiation for prevention 
In this World in search of Order, 
there is a crying need to focus on 
negotiation for prevention.  Crisis 
management is only a part that 
comes too late, conflict management 
is another part that is incomplete 
without resolution, but prevention 
is the frame for the whole picture. 
More than periodic toolkits, a change 
of attitudes toward the field and the 
philosophy of prevention is needed if 
a sound system of World Order is to 
be reinvigorated.
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There is a vast literature on time as 
a constraint and/or a resource in 
the field of negotiation. Practitioners 
and scholars emphasize the crucial 
influence of time pressure in favour-
ing a political deal between parties 
(Lewicki, Saunders and Barry, 2010). 
Successes and failures in ultimatum 
bargaining have been very well 
investigated (Boles et al., 2000). 
Timing of entry is also intensely de-
bated (Anstey, 2010: 254-257). The 
perspective chosen here is rather dif-
ferent. This contribution focuses on 
post-conflict situations and considers 
time in the broadest sense of the 
term. The main hypothesis of this 
paper is that time is one of the most 
decisive variables in determining to 
what extent reconciliation can be 
negotiated between former enemies.
In the aftermath of international or 
civil wars, timing is pivotal, but in a 
paradoxical way: urgency matters as 
much as duration. On the one hand, 
priorities such as rebuilding the po-
litical machinery and the economy, 
or prosecuting human rights abus-
ers, are matters of great urgency. 
As is commonly admitted, “[t]he risk 
of relapse into violent conflict only 
increases with time” (UN Security 
Council S 2011/634, p. 4). This ur-
gency requires extremely quick reac-
tions on the ground and a great sense 
of adaptability. Accordingly, speedy 
decision-making is a necessary condi-
tion for impacting post-conflict transi-
tions. The same comment could be 
made regarding conflict zones, where 
the priority is to reach a cease-fire 
as soon as possible, since each extra 
day results in further casualties. In 
such contexts, the willingness to put 
pressure on the parties to move on is 
understandable; this eagerness be-
ing one of the conditions to prevent 
these parties becoming entrenched in 
never-ending civil wars.
On the other hand, timing is also of 
consequence in terms of duration. 
Speediness, as such, is no guarantee 
of success in the long run. The hopes 
and disillusions resulting from the 
Arab Spring - where political changes 
succeeded one another at a thrilling 
pace – show that acceleration and 
haste can have violent and highly 
questionable consequences. Thus, 
the rush to achieve quick results with 
respect to conflict resolution, and, 
even more so, reconciliation, may 
have no strong roots and may be un-
sustainable. The failure of the Geneva 
II talks on Syria demonstrates the 
extreme difficulty of forward-looking 
outcomes processes (Zartman, 2005). 
Experience with other transitions - 
such as in Iraq, Afghanistan, Tunisia 
and Bosnia-Herzegovina - reminds us 
that time is necessary in order to rec-
ognize the scale of destruction of both 
the infrastructure and the social fabric 
of the country, and to ensure a broad 
political will. If the initial process does 
not allow this indispensable time, the 
rest is often built on sand (Sissons 
and Al-Saiedi 2013).
To address this tension between 
short-term and long-term perspec-
tives, the present contribution is 
divided into two parts. The first ques-
tions the notion of ripeness (Zart-
man, 2000) in a post-conflict context. 
When are people ripe enough to 
favour a rapprochement towards 
their former enemy? The second 
examines the long-term character of 
any process of rapprochement. After 
mass atrocities, changes of attitude, 
emotions and beliefs take time. What 
is the appropriate pace? 
1. RIPENESS: NOT TOO SOON
William Zartman notably emphasized 
the significance of ripeness in the area 
of negotiation. This issue should also 
be addressed with respect to reconcili-
ation. To do so, it is worth underlining 
similarities and divergences between 
these two types of processes (nego-
tiation and reconciliation).
INSPIRING SIMILARITIES
As in any negotiation, parties become 
involved in a reconciliation process 
when they have to do so. They only 
join together in this way if each 
party’s efforts to achieve a unilater-
ally satisfactory result are blocked 
and if the parties feel trapped in a 
costly predicament. Similarly, the no-
tion of “mutually hurting stalemate” 
is relevant in cases of a rapproche-
ment between former enemies. 
When parties find themselves locked 
in a situation that is painful for both 
of them (although not necessarily 
to the same extent or for the same 
reasons), the way out they seek can 
indeed become the starting point of a 
reconciliation process.
The Franco-German case is telling in 
this regard. In a devastated Europe, 
the decision to work towards a rap-
prochement was not a matter of al-
truism, but was rather in both French 
and German national interests. 
Among all the political, economic, 
and security considerations that 
promoted the transformation of rela-
tions between “hereditary enemies”, 
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one was particularly significant: the 
existence of a common enemy in the 
USSR – and therefore the external, 
mostly American, support for rap-
prochement. In such circumstances, 
French and German leaders per-
ceived an undeniable “mutually hurt-
ing stalemate” and considered the 
European Coal and Steel Community 
(ECSC) as their way out. 
Unlike this example, there are many 
cases which show that in the absence 
of a mutually hurting stalemate, the 
pain is not strong enough to drive 
the parties towards reconciliation. 
Situations which have remained 
unchanged for years, such as that 
in Cyprus, are emblematic in this re-
gard. Other cases show that ripeness 
is a necessary but insufficient condi-
tion for launching a reconciliation 
process. Where spoilers considerably 
benefit from intractable conflicts, 
ripeness in the eyes of the population 
cannot lead to effective change on 
the ground. However, as in any other 
negotiation, the absence of ripeness 
is not a valid reason for inaction. In 
cases such as Israel/Palestine or the 
Congo, certain groups are able to 
conceive of a rapprochement with 
the other. Admittedly, without politi-
cal support “from above”, their efforts 
cannot be sufficient to influence the 
whole population. Nevertheless, the 
existence of “pause conflict zones” 
(in contexts that cannot yet be 
qualified as “post-conflict zones”) can 
constitute decisive niches once there 
is a real eagerness to move forward. 
They create the social infrastructure 
which political leaders can count 
upon if they decide to take the risk – 
or the chance - of a rapprochement.
A DIFFERENTIATED RIPENESS
Having looked at these similarities, 
the main question remains: when 
does a protagonist emerge ready to 
make efforts towards reconciliation? 
When do the parties start thinking in 
terms of reconciliation: during or af-
ter the negotiation processes per se? 
At first glance, a variety of scenarios 
can be observed, ranging from cases 
such as South Africa, where Nelson 
Mandela started negotiating recon-
ciliation as soon as the secret talks 
began in the 1980s, to those such as 
Bosnia, where reconciliation was not 
at all on the agenda of the Dayton 
agreement. Besides looking at these 
varied cases, it is useful to take a 
differentiated approach to the issue 
of ripeness, according to the types of 
protagonists calling for reconciliation. 
In this respect, three main situations 
are conceivable. Rather than focus-
ing solely on the top-down versus 
bottom-up debate, it is worth stress-
ing calls for reconciliation coming 
from above, from below and from 
outside (Gluck, 2007). Each of these 
levels suggests a specific response to 
the question of ripeness.
(1) If we first examine the attitude 
of outsiders, a standard pattern can 
be detected: they highlight the need 
for reconciliation immediately after 
the end of the hostilities or even 
before it. The reaction of the former 
French President, Nicolas Sarkozy, 
after the death of Colonel Gaddafi 
is telling in this regard. Just one day 
after the death of the former Libyan 
President, Nicolas Sarkozy had a 
simple message: “What Libya needs 
now is reconciliation. Libyans need 
to forgive each other” (21 October 
2011, AFP). Despite the fact that 
the country was still devastated by 
extreme violence, and despite the 
ambiguity of the notion of forgive-
ness in the aftermath of a dictator-
ship, the reference to reconciliation 
was almost instantaneous. The 
same comment can be made more 
broadly as regards the attitude of 
European Union (EU) representatives 
(Rosoux, 2014). Their insistence on 
reconciliation is both systematic and 
immediate. As the former European 
Commissioner Stefan Füle suggested, 
“there is no alternative to reconcilia-
tion” (Batumi, 11 July 2012). Be they 
in the Balkans or in the Middle East, 
in Mali or Afghanistan, Ivory Coast 
or Somalia, the EU representatives 
appear as “reconciliation heroes”. To 
them, the notion of reconciliation is 
directly associated with the notions 
of peace, stability and reconstruction 
– and therefore presented as neces-
sary. The argument is ambitious: it 
is because the EU itself is the result 
of a successful reconciliation that it is 
duty-bound to promote this process 
all over the world. This resolve has 
been particularly tangible in former 
Yugoslavia. Thus, the European 
Commission recommended starting 
accession talks after the conclusion 
of an agreement between Serbia and 
its province Kosovo. In this respect, 
reconciliation almost serves as an ac-
cession condition for joining the EU. 
The changing attitude of the Serbian 
President, Tomislav Nikolic, towards 
Kosovo, as well as towards the crimes 
committed in Srebrenica, shows that 
the EU’s persistent pressure in favour 
of reconciliation is not completely fu-
tile. However, as many parties argue 
on the ground, it takes more than 
words – essentially words geared 
towards pleasing Brussels - to open 
up an effective path to reconciliation.
(2) As this example suggests, the 
outsiders’ eagerness to call for rec-
onciliation rarely coincides with the 
attitude of officials on each side. 
Rather than referring immediately to 
reconciliation, most leaders predicta-
bly adopt a pragmatic attitude. Their 
perceptions and their potential incli-
nation towards reconciliation totally 
depend on international and domes-
tic constraints. Thus, immediately 
after an election, most Presidents 
unsurprisingly start their mandate 
by extensive calls for national rec-
onciliation. The attitude of President 
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Alassane Ouattara in Côte d’Ivoire il-
lustrates this immediate response. In 
his first official statement, he made it 
clear that reconciliation and national 
unity were the main priorities of the 
country. Yet, in other cases, official 
authorities put the emphasis on the 
need to fight against impunity and 
therefore categorically reject any 
call for reconciliation. The Rwandan 
case is particularly interesting in this 
regard, since it indicates how quickly 
attitudes can change in this respect. 
When the Rwandan Patriotic Front 
came to power in 1994, the objective 
was not reconciliation but justice. 
The message repeated in the coun-
try and abroad was that Rwanda had 
to erase the culture of impunity (that 
lasted for too long and that was one 
of the causes of the genocide). Eight 
years later, the Rwandan president 
Paul Kagame started focusing on 
reconciliation. Three main reasons 
justified this shift. Firstly, justice was, 
in fact, impossible. Since the judici-
ary system was totally ruined after 
the genocide, the number of people 
who had to be tried and sentenced 
was unmanageable. Secondly, jus-
tice could result in the revealing of 
embarrassing truths. Justice meant 
dealing with crimes committed on 
each side, including those which 
were committed in the Congo after 
July 1994. Thirdly, most international 
donors strongly emphasized the 
need for reconciliation in Rwanda. 
This was particularly true of Belgium.
These examples show that, at the po-
litical level, ripeness directly depends 
on the perceived interests of each 
protagonist. This predictable degree 
of opportunism leaves one question 
unanswered. As in the traditional 
game of “chicken”, the question is: 
who will make the first move? As the 
Russian-Polish and Israeli-Palestinian 
cases reveal, most parties refuse 
to take the initiative towards a rap-
prochement. Few leaders are ready to 
expose a form of vulnerability - at least 
in the eyes of their constituencies. 
The choices made by Sadat in 1977 or 
Begin in 2003 were genuinely auda-
cious - but also tragically dangerous.
(3) Besides calls for action coming 
from outside and above, we must 
consider initiatives coming from 
below. This perspective reveals the 
limits of any push towards recon-
ciliation. The reconciliation process 
can not, indeed, be started at any 
time. Immediately after the end of 
hostilities, the population affected 
by the violence rarely calls for a rap-
prochement with those who are still 
perceived as enemies. In Kosovo, to 
take only one example, reconciliation 
between Serbs and Albanians was 
the explicit aim of the United Nations 
peace-consolidation mission. How-
ever, the impossibility of reaching an 
agreement as to the status of Kosovo 
showed that such a purpose cannot 
be imposed from above - it can only 
be an endogenous one. While many 
voices claim that a rapprochement 
between former enemies depends on 
tangible assistance from the interna-
tional community in pursuing such 
a goal, it can hardly be denied that 
the forces for change are primarily 
internal and cannot be coerced.
In the aftermath of mass atroci-
ties, victims simply resist when the 
so-called “politics of reconciliation” 
is perceived as an ideology or as a 
rhetorical argument that seems to 
disregard their suffering. In Rwanda, 
for instance, voices coming from all 
communities rapidly denounced what 
they called the “ideology of reconcilia-
tion”. From their perspective, the right 
question to address is probably not 
when but if reconciliation is possible. 
All these elements show how delicate 
the issue of time management is in 
bringing about reconciliation. While 
institutional and legal measures can 
be taken relatively quickly after the 
end of the conflict, so-called recon-
ciliation policies must not come too 
soon. If so, they are ineffective and 
even sometimes counterproductive.
2. DURATION: NOT TOO QUICK
According to Hayner, reconciliation 
can be understood as a way to build 
“relationships today that are not 
haunted by the conflicts and hatreds 
of yesterday” (2002: 161). From 
that perspective, the critical question 
is not only “what happened?”, but 
also - and above all – “what shall we 
do with the past?” Similarly, one of 
the most fundamental issues is not 
whether to remember or forget, but 
how to remember and forget in order 
to move forward. Events such as par-
ticularly traumatic violations of human 
rights can remain unexpressed for a 
 19www.pin-negotiation.org
period of time – a period that psy-
choanalysts often call “latent”. Some 
specialists refer to a period of 25 
years. However, there does not ap-
pear to be any standard time-period 
in this matter. In Greek tragedies, 
for instance, old debts were only 
paid after three generations (Salles, 
2012). This trans-generational 
transmission is absolutely critical in 
post-conflict situations. Case stud-
ies show that the second and third 
generations remain preoccupied 
with continuing feelings of guilt or 
victimisation, especially when past 
injustices have not been adequately 
addressed by their parents’ genera-
tion. The Armenian-Turkish case is 
emblematic in this regard. The 
persistence of intense emotions has 
specific consequences on the nego-
tiation process. It limits the potential 
concessions made on each side and 
partly explains why certain issues 
remain non-negotiable for decades. 
Resistance can be so strong that it 
is often qualified as “irrational”. One 
way to understand the dynamics 
that lead to this kind of impasse is 
to consider the extent to which the 
process may be “haunted” by the 
past.
AN OPEN-ENDED PROCESS
Far beyond the scope of any “quick 
impact projects” (UNHCR), “the 
path towards reconciliation is a 
marathon, not a sprint”, as the Pol-
ish President Bronislaw Komorowzki 
said after talks with the former Rus-
sian President, Dimitri Medvedev 
(quoted by Dempsey, 2010). The 
open-ended nature of the process 
is confirmed by all case studies. In 
2012, by way of an illustration, the 
Estonian President, Toomas Hendrik 
Ilves, explained that, more than 60 
years later, Estonia was “still wait-
ing for apologies” from the Russian 
authorities (Le Monde, 12 April 
2012). Speaking about the “illegal 
annexation” of his country by the 
Soviet Union after WWII until 1991, 
and more specifically about the 
deportation of 20,000 Estonians to 
Siberia by the NKVD (Soviet political 
police) in 1949, he expressed regret 
that nobody had “ever apologized” 
for these crimes. This is not an 
isolated case - far from it. Thus the 
EU Parliament became a place of 
contentious and highly distributive 
negotiations between Germany and 
Poland, and between Germany and 
the Czech Republic, with respect to 
issues directly linked with the Sec-
ond World War. In another context, 
negotiations between China and 
Japan are constantly at risk from the 
explosive weight of the past. To give 
a final example, the ongoing nego-
tiations between Japan and North 
Korea have always failed to achieve 
closure regarding the Japanese who 
were kidnapped in the 1970s and 
1980s, and who were used as spies 
for Pyongyang  (Le Monde, 31 May 
2014). Each of these examples - and 
there are tens of others - reminds 
us that reconciliation remains unfin-
ished business that requires long and 
arduous negotiations at all levels.
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AN INDIVIDUAL PROCESS
The experience of a Rwandan 
survivor, actively involved in a local 
reconciliation process, confirms both 
the dynamic character and the dura-
tion of the process: “I took the time 
to hate everybody. It took me ten 
years. I needed this time for hatred. 
Now I can think about reconciliation”. 
In listening to this sort of comment, 
many observers emphasize the 
impact of a supposed “natural time 
for healing”. Thus, in April 2014, the 
Canadian government considered 
that a period of two decades was 
symbolically enough to “recover” and 
turn the page of the Rwandan geno-
cide (Montgomery, 2014). However, 
this emphasis on a quasi-magical 
effect of time has to be questioned 
in at least two ways. First, who can 
determine whether ten, twenty, fifty 
or a hundred years is the right time-
period? How can we fix in advance a 
standard pace of healing? Secondly, 
how can one argue in favour of such 
natural healing processes when in 
most cases there is evidence that 
wounds remain? As numerous tes-
timonies tragically remind us, the 
idea of a natural time for healing 
does not systematically correspond 
to reality – far from it (see Pinpoints 
34, 6-9). The experience of Révérien 
Rirangwa is particularly emblematic 
of this oversimplification of survivors’ 
experiences. After witnessing the 
massacre of forty-three relatives, this 
Rwandan survivor was disfigured and 
left for dead. In describing himself 
as a “prisoner of his ghosts and his 
anxieties”, he explains: “my body, 
my face and the sharpest aspect of 
my memory bear the scars of the 
past – and will continue to do so until 
the end of my life” (2007: 14). His 
words are hard-hitting: “Survivors 
are troublemakers. We bother eve-
rybody with our pain, our tragedies, 
our dead ones and our rotten vivid 
memory. (…) The only narrative we 
are allowed can be summed up in 
two words: ‘Reconstruction, Rec-
onciliation’. These watchwords – as 
nice as they are per se – smother the 
survivors’ distress cries” (131).
These accounts raise fundamental 
questions regarding timing in post-
conflict situations. One of them was 
once summarised by a German stu-
dent of mine, who came to me after 
a seminar and asked, movingly: “How 
long?”. Her two-word question meant 
“how long do we Germans have to 
apologize?”; “how long do we have 
to deal with a guilt that is not ours?”; 
“how long will we have to justify our-
selves, compensate for and/or recall 
the events of the past?”. The answer 
given by the German Minister of For-
eign Affairs, Frank Walter Steinmeier, 
confirms the open-ended character 
of the process. As he admitted: “It is 
very dangerous for a politician to say 
that we have succeeded. We have to 
bring evidence of this reconciliation 
[between Germany and its former 
enemies] all the time” (La libre Bel-
gique, 18 February 2014).
* * *
As we look at the many examples, we 
realize that the way in which past ex-
periences are re-lived ultimately de-
pends on each individual’s attitudes, 
emotions and energy. International 
and intercommunity conflicts pro-
voke an infinite series of individual 
fires that need to be extinguished 
one by one. The response to past 
atrocities is ultimately an individual 
one. Far from being reduced to a 
tension purely between anger and 
forgiveness, this individual response 
brings to the surface deep sadness, 
fear, loss of trust and hope, and other 
emotions, which may result in sorrow, 
or, rather, in calls for justice and ac-
countability. All these reactions dem-
onstrate that reconciliation cannot be 
negotiated at any price and/or at any 
time. Therefore it might be useful to 
question our own assumptions. Is the 
aim to distinguish between “good” 
(resilient) victims and “bad” (resent-
ful) victims or to define a new social 
contract? It is if – and only if – the 
diversity of reactions and tempos is 
taken seriously that one can finally 
see an end and a beginning.
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INTRODUCTION
Emerging from a station in central 
Copenhagen recently I found myself 
in the midst of a demonstration, 
with protestors chanting and wav-
ing placards. Suddenly the march 
stopped moving forward – had the 
police arrived, was there a counter 
group blocking the way? No – in fact 
there was not a policeman in sight. A 
street crossing had been reached – 
the little red man was indicating stop. 
The crowd moved through in batches 
in strict compliance with the traffic 
lights! This was all in quite startling 
contrast to the demonstrations that 
occupy media time in my home, 
South Africa. Here the traffic lights 
would have been at risk of destruc-
tion, burning tires might have been 
dragged onto the road, a few cars 
burned and there would have been 
a strong probability of confrontation 
with police! 
A culture of protest action and the 
form that it takes is shaped by many 
factors including legal frameworks, 
social norms, group aspirations, 
emotional intensity of grievances, 
levels of frustration and patterns of 
behavioral response in dealing with 
these (the history of relations). It 
has been said that Lenin despaired 
of German communists’ potentials for 
revolt when he saw them buying sta-
tion tickets to participate in a protest 
organized at the Berlin station. 
Despite a democratic legal frame-
work that promotes freedoms of as-
sociation, assembly, expression and 
protest action (procedural rights), 
it seems that many communities 
in South Africa believe that unless 
they resort to disruptive action or 
there is an element of violence to 
property or persons, their grievances 
and substantive demands will not 
be attended to. It is a perception 
founded in long experience. During 
a negotiation on an impending gen-
eral strike in South Africa in the late 
1980’s, employers sympathized with 
the workers’ cause but complained 
about the disruptive effects of the 
strike on the regional economy. They 
proposed that workers demonstrate 
on a Sunday rather than a workday. 
With a look of amazement the union 
leader replied ‘Look we are not here 
to organize a Sunday picnic – we are 
in a political struggle to end the gov-
ernment of oppression – it’s meant 
to be disruptive!’  
While some individuals in crowds 
may have no shared common pur-
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pose (shoppers in a mall) or share 
fairly benign purposes (support of 
a sports team, or celebration of a 
national day), others represent col-
lectivities deliberately convened to 
communicate a grievance, or create 
a disturbance or disrupt the normal 
flow of public activities, or provoke 
authorities to action in front of 
cameras. 
Crowd control is a challenge for 
public order police in both repressive 
and democratic societies. In the for-
mer they generally violate rules, and 
threaten regime control but police 
are given wide latitude to deliver a 
repressive response. In the latter 
however peaceful demonstrations 
are regarded as an important right, 
embodying freedoms of association, 
assembly and expression. Authorities 
are expected not only to tolerate pro-
test actions but also to facilitate an 
enabling environment for them, and 
to ensure protections for the safety 
and security of both protestors and 
the wider public. Within this balance 
of democratic rights and responsibili-
ties much can go wrong. Opportun-
ists may use crowd situations to carry 
out objectives unrelated to those of 
a demonstration. Attacks on property 
and people and looting may give way 
to violent confrontations between 
police and citizens with casualties 
including bystanders. There may 
be some who have an interest in 
provoking a violent response from 
police as part of a media campaign 
of their own. Police may enter crowd 
control situations with inadequate 
training or equipment, and have 
ill-disciplined members within their 
ranks who carry malevolent feelings 
towards protesting communities, or 
who respond poorly in high stress 
situations. Even in benign crowd 
situations such as sports crowds, an 
unexpected event such as a fire may 
see panic and casualties. 
Television screens carry daily im-
ages of protestors in confrontational 
exchanges with police. Across North 
Africa and the Middle East spontane-
ous protest action mutated into riots, 
then revolutions and civil wars. In 
some there was a rapid collapse of 
regimes (Tunisia, Egypt), in some 
regimes restored order through 
brutal repression (Bahrain); others 
escalated into civil wars (Libya, Syria, 
Yemen), or simply saw continuation 
of a long attritional exchange (Israel-
Palestine). In Kiev, Ukraine, protes-
tors occupied the town square with 
sufficient intensity to see collapse of 
the government but then (perhaps 
an intended consequence) a collapse 
into civil war and wider tensions in 
international relations between Rus-
sia and the European Union and USA. 
In Ferguson, USA, a police killing of a 
young black man gave rise to weeks 
of protest action and occasional riot-
ing. In Brussels violent confrontations 
have taken place between police and 
workers protesting changes to pen-
sion arrangements. In Hong Kong 
activists engage in street protests 
for an open democracy. In South 
Africa social protest action has risen 
to a level described by one analyst 
as a ‘rebellion of the poor’, spiking 
into terrible violence on the platinum 
mines and the Marikana killings.
Thinking about crowds and crowd 
control has shifted. Understanding 
of protests as ‘madding crowds’ has 
given way to one of purposive collec-
tivities. In more enlightened environ-
ments public order policing has moved 
away from simply tactics of escalated 
force to negotiated management ap-
proaches (Schweingruber 2000:371). 
In his review of ‘mob sociology’ theory 
Schweingruber (2000) does not ques-
tion its validity as much as its influ-
ence over police crowd management 
tactics. Crowd management through 
negotiation has been more effec-
tive than the escalated force tactics 
employed by public order police the 
theory originally informed. The extent 
of this shift is reflected in South Afri-
ca’s Goldstone Commission’s report of 
1992, the report of the Human Effects 
Advisory Panel of the Institute for 
Non-lethal Defense Technologies in 
January 2001, and in such documents 
as the Commonwealth Human Rights 
Initiative ‘standards and procedure for 
Crowd control’ published in July 2005.
Crowds mutate into riots when their 
members commit violent or illegal 
actions that disturb the peace. Tradi-
tional understanding of this process 
is one in which individuals lose their 
sense of individual accountability in a 
‘mob mentality’, and commit acts they 
would not usually do because the 
crowd makes them feel anonymous. 
Referring to Momboise’s classic work 
(1967) Schweingruber posits that ‘all 
crowds can transform into lawbreak-
ing mobs’ (2000: 372). The process 
is one that sees angry people gather, 
fuelled by pent up grievances; milling 
around; being brought to a collective 
boil through collective grumbling and 
rumoring; becoming increasingly less 
responsive to extra-group stimuli as 
individuals lose rationality and self-
control as they are absorbed into a 
‘crowd mind’ and behave as parts of a 
larger crowd organism in a context of 
heightened emotionality and anonym-
ity. Under the influence of agitating 
leaders, and following a trigger event 
(a spark) or rumor, these individuals 
may then participate in destructive 
and violent behaviour. It is a dynamic 
that places authorities in a dilemma 
with police accused of fueling violence 
whether they act brutally or too 
weakly. 
Traditionally the thinking was that 
there would be an incident which 
would see people milling about – 
police would be required to do a 
quick read of the situation and try 
to resolve it as quickly as possible to 
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prevent any escalation. If this was 
not achieved however and the crowd 
became more excited and subject to 
influence from emergent agitating 
leaders, these individuals should be 
removed and police should call in 
reinforcements to show a capacity 
for force if the crowd did not dis-
perse. But if this failed and the crowd 
moved to a stage of ‘social contagion’ 
and rioted, police should bring in fur-
ther reinforcements, detain leaders, 
cordon off and isolate the crowd and 
use necessary force to break up and 
disperse the crowd. In peak intensity 
situations police might use dogs and 
then teargas and water-cannons 
to disperse a crowd, and (though 
seldom admitted) lethal weapons to 
‘take out’ identified leaders.
However this approach has been 
revised. In a review of studies of 
crowds and crowd control The Hu-
man Effects Advisory Panel of the 
Institute for Non-lethal Technologies 
in 2001 made several important 
observations of the nature of crowds 
informing modern thinking about 
the management of demonstrations. 
Crowds they concluded:
•  are not unified homogenous enti-
ties but are usually heterogeneous 
and multi-motive;
•  comprise ‘companion clusters’ 
rather than individuals;
•  are not necessarily prone to 
‘anonymity’ dynamics – they do 
not necessarily disable individual 
cognition;
•  are a process – they have begin-
nings, middles and endings;
•  are not necessarily prone to 
violence;
•  are not violent simply because of 
social factors of deprivation, or 
frustration dynamics;
•  seldom see entirely unified ac-
tion – and if there is such action, it 
does not last long;
•  precipitating events / flashpoints 
are usually only identified in 
hindsight rather than being easily 
foreseen and prevented.
Modern thinkers caution against 
simplistic understanding of crowd 
behaviour in which analysts may 
simply find what they are looking for 
in a self-reinforcing cycle of theory 
and structured observation, and poor 
theory comes to inform action. 
Police face dilemmas in managing 
crowd behaviour. In democratic en-
vironments they must both protect 
rights of assembly and protest and 
rights to safety and security of both 
protestors and the wider public.  The 
challenge is how to prevent a crowd 
becoming a mob rather than trying 
to deal with it when it has. And police 
behaviour can be critical to this. Force 
may simply provoke greater resist-
ance and escalate into higher levels 
of violence. The problem has been 
that understanding of mob violence 
has not advanced in many places, 
and if police expect violence they act 
is if it is going to occur (in terms of 
mob theory), failing to recognize that 
their own behaviour may provoke vi-
olence. ‘Thus the theory justified the 
practice, and the practice proved the 
theory’ (Schweingruber 2000:383). 
SHIFTS IN THINKING ABOUT 
CROWDS AND CROWD 
MANAGEMENT
However a change has occurred 
where police have adopted a ne-
gotiated management approach 
to demonstrations. Policy shifts to 
permit rather than stop protests and 
to employ ‘minimum force necessary’ 
softened police actions and limited 
police provocation as an element 
in mob violence. ‘As police started 
trying to accommodate demonstra-
tions, violence became less frequent’ 
(Schweingruber 2000:383). In short 
when authorities achieved greater 
success when they sought not to 
defeat demonstrations but to prevent 
violent breakdown through more col-
laborative means. Strategies should 
in the first instance be aimed at 
preventing breakdowns in demon-
strations, and then to contain and 
defuse and allow tensions to burn out 
through non-confrontational means 
wherever possible. 
GOOD PRACTICE IN CROWD 
MANAGEMENT 
Several elements facilitate good prac-
tice in crowd management. Authori-
ties should have a clear understand-
ing of their purpose and role and they 
should have an ability to assess the 
purposes, nature, composition and 
mood of the crowds they are faced 
with. They should wherever possible 
be proactive in building relationships 
of trust with communities where 
they work for intelligence gathering 
purposes, but also to facilitate nego-
tiations with credible leaders when 
crowd management situations arise. 
If authorities negotiate with organ-
izers of demonstrations over issues 
of timing, venues, routes, acceptable 
behavior, marshaling, and the role 
and location of police, the door is 
also opened to discuss measures to 
limit the risk of breakdowns and re-
sponsibilities amongst organizers and 
various authorities. For example in 
one very big march organized by the 
ANC during South Africa’s transition, 
it was agreed that the police should 
post themselves a few blocks back 
from the crowd. They would be close 
enough to act quickly if things went 
wrong, but not so close as to provoke 
any angry responses from the crowd. 
Marshaling responsibilities belonged 
to the organizers of the march and 
they fulfilled these. The sheer pres-
sure of bodies saw a jeweller’s shop 
window crack – the marshals called 
for a police presence to guard the 
window and ensure that members 
of the crowd understood their pur-
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pose, in effect protecting the police. 
The marshals discovered groups of 
youths interested in provoking a con-
frontation taunting some police who 
were parked away from the agreed 
march – they rather than the police 
brought them back into line. 
PURPOSE
As with all strategies, purpose guides 
action. The purpose of police re-
sponding to demonstrations in demo-
cratic dispensations is to protect the 
rights of all citizens involved – of 
protestors to assemble and to march 
in expression of their grievance, 
and of the wider public to safety of 
person and property. The mission is 
not to defeat a crowd when there is 
breakdown but to defuse tensions. It 
is contain rather than to provoke. Of-
ten easier said than done of course, 
and especially if it is the intention of 
elements of a crowd to provoke the 
use of force by police under the gaze 
of television cameras. At all times 
though police should try to secure 
the moral high ground – it is not a 
military victory that is needed.
Police need to be clear about their 
own purpose and role but they also 
need to understand why a crowd 
has come together. Early studies 
distinguished between collections 
of people gathered for no particular 
common purpose, as in a shopping 
mall (casual crowds); those gathered 
for a particular social purpose such 
as a sports match (conventional 
crowds); those in which people as-
semble for non-destructive celebra-
tory (singing and dancing) purposes 
(expressive crowds); and those 
assembled for more hostile purposes 
(aggressive crowds) where emotional 
intensity makes for a higher risk of 
breakdowns and violence.
Of course there may be many 
gaps between the overt and covert 
purposes of demonstrations, and 
between those of organizers and 
others who might see opportunity in 
using the energy of a demonstration 
for purposes of their own. Those 
negotiating peaceful demonstrations 
need to surface such risks and where 
possible agree a modus operandi 
for managing scenarios in which a 
demonstration is hijacked by more 
aggressive elements. Crowds are no 
longer understood as homogenous 
entities and this offers opportuni-
ties for peaceful management – but 
a heterogeneous composition has 
problems of its own, demanding 
differential responses to sections of 
crowds and if badly handled may 
provoke hostile responses from 
elements that might otherwise have 
been peaceful.
In the case of spontaneous dem-
onstrations police need to quickly 
identify the purpose of the action: 
benign communication, expression of 
anger, media attention, provocation 
of authorities, get someone to come 
down and negotiate. And of course 
they need to determine whether in 
fact the action is spontaneous or 
simply the coming together of a well-
planned campaign by organizers who 
have chosen not to communicate 
with authorities. 
The higher the risk of violence reflected 
in the purpose of the crowd the greater 
the need to negotiate the modus 
operandi of a march with its organ-
izers. Even in apparently spontaneous 
gatherings police should try to identify 
leaders with whom they can talk.
EFFECTIVE PREVENTION
Two major preventive processes can 
be identified for police: one long-term 
and in the form of context creation, 
the other more immediate and in 
the form of negotiations around the 
conduct of marches. Police should 
do lots of preventive work building 
long-term relations with communi-
ties, establishing community-police 
forums for trust building and infor-
mation gathering purposes. They 
should ‘make good things happen for 
communities’, foster the building of 
relations between specific police and 
specific communities; and develop a 
deep knowledge of the communities 
and its social patterns. Apart from the 
value of such steps for normal crime 
prevention and detection, it serves to 
create an environment conducive to 
the second desirable process – the 
negotiated demonstration.
If communities see value in demon-
strations and trust in police to protect 
their rights to protest it facilitates 
cooperation. With notice planners of 
protest action and police might nego-
tiate a wide set of parameters for the 
activity: times, routes to be followed, 
marshaling, the form of police in-
volvement, communication channels 
between protest leaders and police, 
the actions of other authorities such 
as local government officials to whom 
petitions may be delivered. 
CROWD MOOD & SPONTANEITY
Purpose is often matched by mood. 
Those interested in managing dem-
onstrations require skills in identify-
ing shifts in crowd climate; whether 
it is a celebratory, grieving, or angry 
assembly – and whether a change in 
crowd mood is occurring and why. 
Celebratory or conventional crowds 
don’t arrive with weapons; spontane-
ous gatherings don’t wave printed 
placards. So there may be signals of 
the degree of spontaneity or organi-
zation within a crowd that authorities 
need to understand and work with. 
In the case of organized crowds there 
will be an organizing person or group 
with focus and purpose and organiz-
ing systems in terms of networks and 
use of media. Spontaneous crowds 
emerge in response to particular 
incidents or triggers and dependent 
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on access to a gathering point, avail-
ability of people and their priorities, 
including work and family responsibili-
ties, daily routines and chores! 
Crowd composition & leadership
As indicated crowds are seldom en-
tirely unified or homogenous entities 
– they are often heterogeneous and 
multi-motive in character reflecting 
‘companion clusters’ whose purposes 
for participation differ. Within crowds 
it is helpful to identify ‘energy pock-
ets’ shaping crowd behavior, and the 
nature of such energy: anger, cel-
ebration, fun, grief. Energy pockets 
of course relate to leadership – are 
there leaders who might be engaged 
for negotiation purposes, or to tar-
get for arrest should resort to more 
forceful tactics be obliged later in the 
process?
CROWD CONTROL
Crowds can take many forms and 
once formed may mutate. Police 
require skills in continuous crowd 
assessment. The negotiated dem-
onstration offers greater but not 
absolute certainty regarding crowd 
behavior, enabling shared responsi-
bility for the conduct of a march and 
channels of communication to be set 
up between demonstration leaders 
and police and other authorities. 
Spontaneous demonstrations are 
more difficult to respond to – and 
especially ‘planned’ spontaneous 
action organized through social me-
dia which may see police knowing 
action is impending but not exactly 
sure where, or involving how many. 
Planned ‘spontaneous’ demonstra-
tions of course reflect a deliberate 
effort to evade negotiations with 
authorities, to disrupt through sur-
prise. They present real difficulties of 
management.
SPATIAL AND OTHER 
DIMENSIONS  
Experts suggest that how groups 
assemble indicates how they will dis-
perse. Police should avoid trapping or 
cornering crowds, allowing exits and 
opportunities for dispersal and es-
cape. It seems people die in crowds 
less because of panic stampeding 
than not being able to see what is go-
ing on – they are often not disorderly 
as much as uninformed about how 
to leave. Distancing affects crowd 
behavior – if police are too close it 
can provoke; too far does not allow 
for a quick response – the message 
carried through police positioning 
should be ‘containment’ rather than 
confrontation.  
‘Pray for rain’ – it is a known cooler 
of hot crowds. Authorities should 
consider the impact of weather 
conditions on situations, as well as 
access to food and water and needs 
for sleep and warmth. Interventions 
may not be needed if crowds can be 
contained long enough. Of course 
activists have also considered this in 
recent times, bringing tents and sup-
plies with them in their occupation of 
town squares. These tactics change 
the waiting game but the contain 
rather than contend rationale should 
be preserved for as long as possible. 
Police should proactively negotiate 
with those who will talk; validate 
leaders with credibility amongst 
activists partly because they have 
influence but also because it concen-
trates accountability. People listen to 
their own leaders first, and commit to 
rules they’ve negotiated rather than 
ones imposed.
The message is ‘we want to help 
you do this responsibly’ but police 
sometimes neglect their key role of 
networking. Responsible protest 
requires responsive government. 
Police should be active in networking 
into the frame political and business 
leaders with whom activists want to 
talk, and locate credible mediators 
where they may lack such credentials 
within their own ranks. The search is 
for non-violent resolution and wider 
social responsibility is often required. 
Those faced with managing demon-
strations to peaceful conclusions also 
need the media as an ally rather than 
an enemy – and should have strate-
gies to this effect.
THE USE OF FORCE
A longstanding principle observed by 
police in civilized jurisdictions is that 
minimum necessary force be used to 
achieve a desired objective. Modern 
thinking is to contain and dissipate 
rather than disperse or defeat res-
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tive crowds. The use of force should 
require top-level authority from 
within the police, and it should be 
minimalist in character and progres-
sive in implementation with the use 
of firearms as a last resort, after the 
use of teargas, batons and water 
cannons. Baton charges should only 
take place after clear warnings and 
following a signal (such as a whistle 
that can be clearly understood by a 
crowd). Baton blows should be aimed 
at soft portions of the body, avoiding 
contact with the head as far as pos-
sible. If baton charges are not suc-
cessful resort to firing (rubber bullets 
first) may occur after warning the 
crowd and only on the authority of 
the most senior officer. Aim should be 
low, directed at the part of the crowd 
that is most threatening and ceased 
immediately when the crowd shows 
signs of dispersing. Help should be 
given any wounded. The proceedings 
should be accurately recorded – in 
reports and in modern times through 
video recordings.
Grabianowski (2014) outlines how 
police usually operate in riot sce-
narios. They are usually well-armed 
but seek to prevent injuries. They 
operate in a squared formation with 
commanders and an arrest team at 
the centre. This formation facilitates 
rapid response to changing situations 
and a capacity to respond to attacks 
from any quarter. Police try to allow 
escape routes rather than to entrap 
rioters. Moving forward police allow 
protestors into the centre of the 
square where they can be arrested 
and then close ranks before moving 
forward again and repeating the 
process. The task is to prevent rather 
than provoke violence. The use of 
batons precedes the use of firearms 
which requires special training to 
reduce risks of serious injury or fa-
talities. Rounds used escalate from 
wood and rubber to foam or sponge 
for close quarter work. Rounds may 
include pepper-spray, water or be 
in the form of paint or dye balls – 
a hit is painful but does not cause 
permanent harm. The discipline of 
the police formation accompanied by 
stamping and banging of shields is 
intended to intimidate and encourage 
dispersal. Arrests should be selective 
with leaders targeted. Defuse, deter, 
disperse are the range of objectives 
rather than defeat of a crowd.
CONCLUSION 
Anyone who has been involved in 
the management of large scale ag-
gressive demonstrations will have a 
tangible sense of the tensions that 
run through exchanges between ac-
tivists and authorities, and especially 
the police who find themselves on 
the frontline of such events. There 
is no room for naivete or weakness, 
but equally little for bullying or ex-
cessive force. The shift in managerial 
logic on the part of police in demo-
cratic societies has been away from 
tactics of defeating crowds, to ones 
directed at protecting the rights of 
all parties, preventing breakdown, 
shared responsibility for the control 
of marches, foreseeing and agreeing 
possible breakdown scenarios … and 
only as last resort the use of force 
within a strict protocol of managed 
escalation. The means through which 
this shift is worked out is negotiation. 
Not uncommonly it seems activists 
use tactics that signal no desire to 
negotiate – they want to ‘ambush’ 
a system, disrupt rather than simply 
communicate, provoke authorities 
into repressive responses – and 
these present police and other au-
thorities with very real dilemmas. If 
police accept a role as protectors of 
illegitimate repressive regimes, the 
dilemmas are reduced. But if they see 
their primary role as being to protect 
citizens and the rights of citizens to 
express resistance to oppression 
they assume a much complex role 
as frontline protectors of all citizens, 
and mediators of social change. 
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In the contemporary world of grow-
ing complexity where major social, 
political, and economic shifts are 
determined by unexpected, cascade, 
and even catastrophic developments, 
facilitation of coordination among ac-
tors become vital. When decisions on 
cooperation or conflict de-escalation 
have to be taken under severe time 
pressure, the importance of conspicu-
ous solutions is difficult to overesti-
mate. Such solutions are often called 
“focal points” and include numbers, 
objects, and phenomena the value 
of which as bases for coordination is 
expected be evident to all parties in-
volved. This essay looks at the role of 
focal points in facilitating arms control 
negotiations – a key activity shaping 
contemporary international security. 
The intuitive point of departure for 
the analysis presented in this essay is 
that symbolism plays a crucial role in 
enabling compromise in arms control 
negotiation – an area prone to zero-
sum thinking and excessive concerns 
about falling victim to artful exploita-
tion by the opponent.
Thomas Schelling and his followers 
suggested two strategies of identify-
ing potential focal points during nego-
tiations or other types of interactions 
among humans. First, a focal point 
may be found in a certain conspicuous 
material phenomenon.1   For example, 
the main clock at a city’s central rail-
way station is usually identified as the 
default meeting place. In arms con-
trol, the range that separates strategic 
and other classes of missiles is agreed 
to be 5,500 km – roughly the distance 
a missile launched in Eurasia has to 
travel to reach North America, and 
vice versa. The “focal allure” of these 
points, usually called “salient,” results 
from the fact that they are expected 
to be evident even to individuals who 
seek coordination but are unable 
to communicate. Absent a widely-
recognized natural phenomenon or a 
landmark underpinning a focal point, 
participants in a negotiation without 
communication cannot resolve coor-
dination problems. Some observers 
have noted, however, that the ef-
fectiveness of “non-communicable” 
focal points was debatable because it 
was not guaranteed that the parties 
“would attach the same salience to 
the same point.”2 
Second, a round number that does 
not correspond to any widely known 
phenomenon can serve as a focal 
point in a negotiation where parties 
are able to communicate freely. Round 
numbers can be found in almost any 
area under negotiation, including 
arms control. A round numerical solu-
tion need not be so unique as to be 
identifiable without communication 
MIKHAIL TROITSKIY
FOCAL POINTS IN ARMS CONTROL 
1  Schelling, Thomas, The Strategy of Conflict, (Cam-
bridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1960), pp. 57, 
77; Schelling, Thomas, Arms and Influence, (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 1966), p. 137.
2  Freedman, Lawrence, Strategy: A History, (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2013), p. 167.
28 PIN•Points 41/2015
between the parties. Schelling, who 
was mostly looking at cases of rapid 
crisis escalation in which adversaries 
did not have enough time to com-
municate, was not interested in this 
second source of focal points.3 
Both types of focal points have gained 
traction in arms control. On one hand, 
arms control is a less rapidly unfolding 
process than a real-time international 
crisis or war, so focal points in arms 
control are mostly numerical and situ-
ational, that is, they are picked in the 
vicinity of negotiators’ initial positions. 
On the other hand, conspicuous, or 
salient solutions are also used – for 
example, when negotiators need to 
delineate geographic boundaries of 
areas to fall under a negotiated arms 
control regime. 
CLASSIFYING ARMS CONTROL 
SOLUTIONS
From the focal point perspective, one 
can identify three types of solutions 
embodied in arms control agreements.
1) Non-focal point. Most of negotiated 
arms control solutions come in such 
form. These solutions are reached 
without reliance on any symmetry or 
beauty of the number. In many cases, 
numbers in arms control negotiations 
are picked in a consensual manner 
without the need to attract negotiat-
ing parties to a position that they 
would otherwise not consider optimal 
based on their interests. In such 
situations, the beauty of the number 
may be present, but is not necessary 
to override anyone’s initial negotiat-
ing position. Only a small share of 
numbers in arms control agreements 
conform to the definition of a focal 
point. 
For example, the round numbers used 
extensively in the New START (2010) 
and Conventional Forces in Europe 
(1990) treaties were not needed as 
tools of drawing the positions of the 
sides closer to one another; agree-
ment on these numbers was quite 
easy for the negotiating parties to 
reach before they had to address 
more controversial issues. According 
to senior negotiators involved in the 
most recent round of strategic arms 
control talks between the United 
States and Russia, the ceilings for 
deployed nuclear warheads to be 
enshrined in the New START Treaty 
of 2010 were in fact not difficult to 
agree upon. Neither side considered 
it a major concession to commit to 
observing the maximum of 1,550 de-
ployed warheads and 800 of deployed 
and non-deployed carriers.4 
In a similar vein, the Conventional 
Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty signed 
in 1990 and the preceding negotia-
tions on “mutual and balanced force 
reductions” in Europe involved dozens 
of numbers most of which were, ac-
cording to the existing accounts of 
CFE negotiations, in no way focal.
Overall, in arms control negotiations, 
numbers often generate less conten-
tion than, for example, the terms on 
which the sides would be monitoring 
and verifying implementation of the 
negotiated agreement. In these and 
many other cases, the round num-
bers’ “focal promise,” which can be 
defined as the power of attraction, 
was either unnecessary or weak.
2) Non-equilibrium focal point. This is 
a focal point in the vicinity of which 
there is another focal point, so that 
a shift from one to the other can oc-
cur relatively easily and oftentimes 
unexpectedly. One example of non-
equilibrium focal points is provided 
by counter-value and counter-force 
targeting principles in nuclear strat-
egy. Each principle is based on an 
underlying coherent logic that can 
be adopted by the mutually deter-
ring sides. Counter-value targeting 
is premised on the belief that even 
a minimal risk of a major city being 
hit by a nuclear-tipped missile is 
sufficient to prevent one’s adversary 
from all-out aggression. In its turn, 
counter-force targeting is based on 
the assumption that a nuclear war can 
be fought and won by a sudden dis-
arming strike that would eliminate all 
(or almost all) of adversary’s retalia-
tory capability. While it would be most 
economically and politically sensible 
for a dyad of potential nuclear-armed 
adversaries to converge around the 
counter-value principle, certain trends 
in the evolution of their mutual politi-
cal attitudes and force structures can 
result in a quantum shift to counter-
force targeting – a much more costly 
and risky posture. In broad terms, 
the choice of posture depends on the 
dominant worldviews among decision 
makers, namely, whether they believe 
in deterrence in general and whether 
they believe that the side which has a 
bigger arsenal stands real chances of 
prevailing in a crisis.
It can be argued that the two princi-
ples under discussion during the CFE 
talks also constituted non-equilibrium 
focal points. The Soviet Union started 
off by demanding mutual force reduc-
tions in equal proportion to the initial 
numbers (in which Moscow had an 
advantage). In its turn, the United 
States and its European allies insisted 
that the USSR should introduce greater 
cuts that would eliminate the disparity 
between the Warsaw Pact and NATO. 
Eventually, the reform-minded Soviet 
leader Mikhail Gorbachev agreed in 
1988 to the principle of parity be-
cause he considered the numbers 
of Soviet troops deployed in Eastern 
Europe excessive and unaffordable. 
This change of preferred focal point 
3  Schelling, Thomas, The Strategy of Conflict, pp. 
100-101.
4  See, for example: Lewis, Jeffrey, Bar Nunn, Foreign 
Policy Blog, October 17, 2012, http://www.foreign-
policy.com/articles/2012/10/17/bar_nunn
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allowed to promptly conclude the 
negotiations and sign the CFE Treaty 
in November 1990.
A similar focal-point debate unfolded 
during U.S.-Soviet negotiations on 
intermediate-range missiles. Under 
the leadership of Gorbachev, the 
Soviet Union eventually agreed to the 
complete elimination of this whole 
class of missiles which implied bigger 
reductions in absolute numbers for 
the Soviet Union than for the United 
States. An alternative solution would 
have been to cut similar numbers of 
missiles or to compensate Moscow in 
a certain way for scrapping a greater 
number of weapons.
The Global Zero principle – total 
elimination of nuclear weapons – is 
another example of a non-equilibrium 
focal point. As an end-state, the Global 
Zero is morally attractive; however, it 
does not represent a Nash equilibrium 
given the difficulties of compliance 
verification and everyone’s tempta-
tion to obtain a decisive edge by 
quickly (and covertly) deploying just 
a few nuclear weapons.
3) Equilibrium focal points. These 
are focal negotiation outcomes in the 
vicinity of which there are no evident 
focal alternatives based on different 
concepts of justice, such as “equal 
cuts” vs “total elimination.” Numerous 
examples of equilibrium focal points 
are provided below.
Both equilibrium and non-equilibrium 
focal points in arms control usually 
come in one of the following forms:
•  numbers: round or otherwise 
“magical,” that is, sticking out 
because of certain special 
characteristics;
•  symmetries: points at the same 
distance from the preferred posi-
tion of each negotiating side;
•  natural or other physical phenom-
ena or objects, such as borders 
drawn along rivers or mountain 
ridges or physical principles under-
lying weapon technologies.
Several trends in the use of focal 
points in arms control deserve closer 
attention.
THE PROMISE OF NUMBERS
Round numbers began playing a vis-
ible role in arms control negotiations 
with the emergence of mass-pro-
duced standardized weapons. As the 
number of weapons at the disposal of 
each negotiating party was rising to 
overkill levels, these numbers became 
very large and abstract. A recent think 
tank report on the U.S. nuclear weap-
ons capability suggested that “deep 
uncertainty [persists] in estimating 
the adequacy of nuclear forces: how 
will they work in the environment 
they might create? Lacking data, 
planners sought assurance in larger 
inventories, while analysts usually had 
recourse to modeling gains and losses 
under simplistic scenarios contrived 
to show the numerical consequences 
of various constraints—what Aron 
derided as ‘strategic fiction.’”5 
With abstract models and simplistic 
scenarios ruling the day, solutions 
based on numerical focal points 
became easier for negotiators. This 
concerned, first and foremost, nuclear 
explosive devices and the means of 
their delivery. Over the 1960s, con-
sensus emerged between the United 
States and the Soviet Union, as well 
as on a broader multilateral scale, 
that the accelerating expansion of the 
deadly arsenals had to be contained. 
First results were achieved by the 
early 1970s in the form of “ceilings” 
imposed on further growth of Soviet 
and American nuclear stockpiles. At 
approximately the same time, nego-
tiations opened between NATO and 
the Warsaw Treaty Organization on 
limiting the massive conventional 
weapons arsenals that the two blocs 
had accumulated in Europe. CFE talks 
also had the potential to become rich 
in focal point outcomes. 
However, the power of focal points in 
arms control failed to fully material-
ize. Numbers are usually dictated by 
the sides’ strategies and postures, 
that is, by their determination of the 
most likely adversaries and conflict 
scenarios. Arms control negotiations 
usually focus on the possibility of 
an agreed change in postures that 
would, in turn, lead to a review of the 
optimal numbers of weapons neces-
sary to maintain the new posture. 
Once postures are defined, agreeing 
on numbers becomes relatively easy. 
At the same time, round or otherwise 
“magic” numbers can serve as refer-
ence points that attract attention 
of negotiators and prompt them to 
consider changes in posture that 
would correspond to those “magic” 
numbers. 
For the United States and the Soviet 
Union (Russia) rising numbers be-
came both the cause and result of the 
choice in favor of counter-force tar-
geting. Large nuclear stockpiles only 
make sense if nuclear weapons are 
regarded as a war-fighting capability 
and as usable and allowing to prevail 
in a conflict. Mutually deterring sides 
stay at low numbers if they only see 
nuclear weapons as a guarantee 
against ultimate defeat in a conven-
tional conflict and do not consider 
surprise disarming strike scenarios 
as realistic. The decision by the two 
nuclear superpowers to proceed with 
building massive overkill arsenals sig-
nified a choice in favor of the counter-
5  Butterworth, Robert, Slouching Toward Zero: 
Considering U.S. Nuclear Weapons Programs and 
Policy, George C. Marshall Institute Policy Outlook 
Brief, April 2013, p. 6, http://marshall.org/missile-
defense/slouching-towards-zero-considering-u-s-
nuclear-weapons-programs-and-policy/
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force targeting focal point. Once the 
U.S. and Soviet postures were ad-
justed and sides moved by the 1980s 
towards discussing disarmament op-
tions (as opposed to just agreeing to 
cap the arsenals’ growth), the exact 
number of retained warheads and/or 
missiles became – within certain limits 
determined by the postures – less a 
matter of principle than of a technical 
decision.
At the same time, the three other 
NPT-compliant nuclear-armed states, 
including China, have remained con-
tent with their limited arsenals, un-
willing or unable to plan for responses 
to a potential first disarming strike by 
an adversary. Their nuclear postures 
remain centered on the focal point of 
counter-value targeting. In the recent 
years, according to some analysts, 
India and Pakistan reached counter-
force numbers and are therefore likely 
to be planning for retaliation against 
massive surprise nuclear attacks by 
the other side.6 
Once the United States and the Soviet 
Union securely locked themselves in 
an overkill situation, win-sets in arms 
control negotiations between them 
or their blocs began to be based on 
raw estimates of “sufficient” numbers 
rather than on exact calculations or 
plans of using the weapons, especially 
nuclear. For example, it became popu-
lar to claim, in Moscow or Washington, 
that a nuclear superpower “cannot 
afford” to reduce its nuclear arsenal 
below the sum of warheads deployed 
by second-tier nuclear-weapon states. 
Alternatively, it was maintained, a 
nuclear superpower needs to aim 
for an order-of-magnitude edge in 
numbers of a nuclear superpower 
over any second-tier nuclear-weapon 
state. Both assumptions converged 
on 1,000 as the minimum acceptable 
number of deployed warheads to be 
retained by a nuclear superpower.
Apparently leveraging 1,000 warheads 
as a focal point, U.S. President Barack 
Obama asserted in his June 19, 2013 
speech in Berlin that the United States 
“can ensure the security of America 
and our allies, and maintain a strong 
and credible strategic deterrent, while 
reducing our deployed strategic nucle-
ar weapons by up to one-third.”7 The 
number of deployed U.S. warheads at 
the time of this speech was capped 
by the New START Treaty at 1,550. 
The Russian side, subject to the same 
limit, did not explicitly endorse the 
1,000 warheads goal citing concerns 
with U.S. plans to deploy potentially 
robust missile defenses. However, the 
number 1,000 previously featured in 
public statements by Russian officials 
who suggested that 1,000 would be 
the absolute minimum Moscow could 
possibly consider if “smaller” nuclear-
armed states continue to refrain from 
multilateral limitations talks with the 
United States and Russia.
The “arbitrary focal numbers” phe-
nomenon also transpired in the de-
bates on “unacceptable damage” from 
a nuclear attack. At the height of the 
cold-war era arms race, policymakers 
in the U.S. and the USSR had to make 
bold assumptions about the scale of 
the destruction that the adversary 
would prefer not to risk. U.S. Defense 
Secretary Robert McNamara defined 
the situation of mutually assured 
destruction (neither side is tempted 
to undertake a surprise disarming 
nuclear strike against the adversary) 
as one in which the attacker would be 
sure to lose at least 25 percent of its 
the population and 50 percent of its 
industrial capacity.
As the prominent military strategy 
expert Lawrence Freedman noted, 
these numbers were not just beauti-
6  See, for example: Krepon, Michael, What Went Wrong 
with Arms Control, The Arms Control Wonk Blog, 
July 30, 2013, http://krepon.armscontrolwonk.com/
archive/3853/what-went-wrong-with-arms-control 
7  President Barack Obama, Remarks at the Branden-
burg Gate, Berlin, June 19, 2013, http://www.white-
house.gov/the-press-office/2013/06/19/remarks-
president-obama-brandenburg-gate-berlin-germany 
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ful, but arbitrary: “These levels […] 
reflected less a judgment about the 
tolerances of modern societies and 
more the point at which extra explo-
sions would result in diminishing 
marginal returns measured by new 
damage and casualties, the point at 
which – to use Winston Churchill’s 
vivid phrase – ‘all you are going to do 
is make rubble bounce’.8”
Despite the arbitrariness of large 
numbers, some focal points in arms 
control crystallized as a result of diffi-
cult negotiations and the focal points’ 
significant power of attraction.
SALIENT POINTS
“The number that matters most in 
norm-setting is zero,” noted one 
prominent arms control analyst. 
He continued: “This number is the 
clearest and most meaningful way to 
set norms and customary practices 
among responsible states. The num-
ber zero is embedded in the CTBT, the 
Chemical Weapons Convention, and 
the Biological Weapons Convention. 
States that do not honor the number 
zero become, ipso facto, outliers.”9 
Zero is indeed one of the most pow-
erful focal points in arms control and 
far beyond this area. On the bilateral 
level, the US-Soviet Intermediate 
Nuclear Forces treaty of 1987 falls 
under the same zero category. This 
treaty completely eliminated two 
classes of ground-launched missiles 
covering the ranges between 500 
and 5,500 km.
Yet however attractive zero may be as 
a beautiful number supposedly signi-
fying absolute security for everyone, 
in many contexts it has the clear trap-
pings of a non-equilibrium focal point. 
Many opponents of zero argue that 
it would be very hard to detect and 
timely punish any breaches of a zero-
based norm. Analyst Michael Krepon 
argues that “[b]ecause numbers of 
chemical and biological weapons that 
are greater than zero can be hidden, 
suspicions can only be conclusively 
affirmed by use, if they cannot be 
revealed by national technical means 
or intrusive treaty-monitoring re-
gimes.”10  Another critic points out 
that Global Zero will be achieved by 
default as soon as nuclear arms be-
come redundant and/or outmoded. 
This may happen if a more powerful 
weapon of deterrence is invented or 
if the risk of conflict involving major 
global or regional players is reduced 
to unimportant levels.11 
Focal point in arms control can also 
take the form of a calendar date. 
January 1, 1967 was chosen by the 
Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) nego-
tiators as the cutoff date pivotal for 
the treaty. By setting the criterion of 
a nuclear test conducted before this 
date, this point helped to resolve the 
non-trivial problem of who should 
be allowed to keep nuclear weapons 
under NPT.
Time focal points sometimes crystal-
lize when negotiators face the need to 
reach a new agreement not just be-
fore the existing one has expired, but 
to commemorate a certain anniver-
sary of another treaty. For example, 
the United States and Russia sought 
to sign a new START treaty before 
the May 2010 date of opening of the 
NPT Review Conference. In that way, 
Washington and Moscow wanted to 
present non-nuclear weapon states 
with a major accomplishment on the 
way towards nuclear disarmament – 
an NPT commitment of nuclear-armed 
nations. The treaty was indeed signed 
in Prague on April 10, 2010 – three 
weeks before the NPT Review Confer-
ence kicked off in New York.
NPT itself contained a provision man-
dating discussion about the extension 
of the treaty at a certain focal date 
in the future. The treaty entered into 
force in 1970 for the term of 25 years 
thus making 1995 an important focal 
point when the future of NPT had to 
be determined.
Verification regimes in arms control 
provide some valuable examples of 
focal points. “Everything is accessible 
to everyone” principle is enshrined in 
the Antarctic Treaty of 1959.  Twelve 
signatory states have the right to 
send representatives to inspect any 
area in the Antarctic, including any 
signatory’s scientific bases, arriving 
sea vessels and their cargo.12 In a 
similar vein, the Seabed Treaty of 
1971 allows all parties to fully monitor 
one another’s seabed activity beyond 
the 12-mile territorial waters zone.13 
A competing focal point in the sphere 
of verification would imply a maximum 
number of permitted  inspections. For 
example, the US-Russian New START 
treaty of 2010 envisages 18 annual 
short-notice on-site inspections (in 
addition to inspections carried out by 
national technical means) in order to 
verify observance of the treaty limits 
and conversion or elimination of deliv-
ery systems. This includes 10 on-site 
inspections of deployed warheads and 
deployed and non-deployed delivery 
systems at ICBM bases, submarine 
bases, and air bases (Type One in-
spections) and 8 on-site inspections 
at facilities that may hold only non-
deployed delivery systems (Type Two 
inspections).14  The Open Skies Treaty 
of 1992 provides for an equal number 
of “passive” and “active” inspections 
for groups of participating countries. 
Each signatory – alone or together 
8  Freedman, Lawrence, Strategy: A History, p. 170.
9  Krepon, Michael, The Future of Arms Control, The 
Arms Control Wonk Blog, August 6, 2013, http://
krepon.armscontrolwonk.com/archive/3858/
the-future-of-arms-control 
 10 Ibid.
11  Tetrais, Bruno, The Four Strawmen of the Apoca-
lypse, Survival, issue 55 no. 6, December 2013 
– January 2014.
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with another participant – is assigned 
a number of overflight inspections by 
other signatory nations and is entitled 
to the same annual number of flights 
over other signatories’ territory.15 In 
its turn, the Comprehensive Test Ban 
Treaty requires a qualified majority 
of signatory nations (30 out of 51) to 
launch an on-site inspection of a sus-
pected nuclear test. The exact figure 
of 30 votes in favor of an inspection 
was agreed upon as a result of a mid-
way compromise between the focal 
figure of 50 percent (25 votes) and 
some nation’s insistence on the two-
thirds majority (34 votes). This very 
mode of reaching the consensus to be 
enshrined in the treaty also exempli-
fied a focal point solution.
In bilateral US-Soviet and Russian 
arms control negotiations, any nu-
merical solutions reached (concerning 
permitted numbers of missiles or war-
heads, details of inspections regimes 
etc.) reflected, apart from the sides’ 
postures, compromises between their 
espoused notions of justice. The 
United States has regarded as fair 
its preponderance over any potential 
rival – possibly, out of belief that even 
in an overkill situation, advantage in 
numbers still matters.16 Russia cen-
tered its negotiating position on parity 
with United States for parity’s own 
sake, refusing inter alia to consider 
the option of minimal counter-value 
deterrence that could be based, for 
example, on the submarine-launched 
component of the nuclear triad. 
While questioning the need for parity, 
the U.S. side equally rejected minimal 
deterrence. In the 2010 Nuclear Pos-
ture Review (NPR) report, the Obama 
administration argued that “the need 
for strict numerical parity between 
the two countries is no longer as 
compelling as it was during the Cold 
War.” However, it also warned against 
“large disparities in nuclear capa-
bilities” that “could raise concerns on 
both sides and among U.S. allies and 
partners, and may not be conducive 
to maintaining a stable, long-term 
strategic relationship.”17 
Finally, a clash of non-equilibrium 
focal principles has occurred in the 
debate on the definition of outer 
space. Russia prefers the borderline 
to have an exact numerical value: 
outer space begins at the altitude 
of 100 km above the sea level. The 
alternative approach championed 
by the United States is based on 
the distinction between two physical 
forces allowing an object to lift off 
the ground: aerodynamic or gravi-
tational. According to this principle, 
airplanes flying thanks to the lifting 
power of their wings in the air would 
be considered travelling in the at-
mosphere while a missile orbiting the 
Earth thanks to gravitation would be 
regarded as an outer space object.
These principles are mutually ex-
clusive, and each of them has clear 
practical implications desirable for 
the respective party. Deployment 
of weapons of mass destruction in 
outer space is prohibited by the Outer 
Space Treaty of 1967. If the U.S. 
interpretation of the atmosphere / 
outer space border is adopted, Russia 
will be faced with the possibility of a 
high-flying WMD-equipped aircraft – 
a prospect Moscow considers a threat 
to its security. If the Russian definition 
is accepted, the United States will be 
deprived of the opportunity to deploy 
high-altitude weapon systems that 
Washington believes it is capable of 
developing in the long run.
CONCLUSION
Focal points have so far played a vis-
ible yet limited role in arms control. 
For the most part, arms control is 
negotiation about principles – broad 
concepts of threat, deterrence, force 
structure and posture etc. – rather 
than numbers. Once principles are 
defined, agreement on exact numbers 
of weapons can be reached relatively 
easily. Principles usually imply alter-
native focal points with arms control 
talks being essentially centered on 
making a choice among these points. 
Negotiating sides seek to substantiate 
the rightfulness of their respective ver-
sions of a focal point on the grounds 
of fairness or effectiveness. The 
competing focal points can be defined 
as “non-equilibrium,” that is, allowing 
a shift from one to another without 
losing the basic characteristics of a 
focal point understood as a solution 
grounded in a certain interpretation of 
justice or the “beauty” of the number. 
This does not mean, however, that, 
once reached, a non-equilibrium focal 
point is doomed to be dropped soon 
in favor of a competing focal point. In 
fact, solutions such as the zero prin-
ciple applied to intermediate ballistic 
missiles are resilient enough to remain 
in place for decades. However, the 
probability of them being challenged 
at a later time through invocation of 
a competing focal point is higher than 
the same probability for equilibrium 
focal points. The lack of stability of 
non-equilibrium focal outcomes in 
arms control can be explained by the 
equal standing enjoyed by alternative 
conceptions of justice.
12  See: Antarctic Treaty (1959), http://www.atomi-
carchive.com/Treaties/Treaty1.shtml
13  See: Seabed Treaty (1971), http://www.atomi-
carchive.com/Treaties/Treaty7.shtml 
14  See: New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New 
START) (2010). http://www.atomicarchive.com/
Treaties/Treaty24.shtml 
15  See: Open Skies Treaty at a Glance, Arms Con-
trol Association, https://www.armscontrol.org/
factsheets/openskies 
16  A scientific version of this argument was developed 
most recently in: Kroenig, Matthew, Nuclear Superi-
ority and the Balance of Resolve: Explaining Nuclear 
Crisis Outcomes, International Organization, vol. 67 
iss. 1, January 2013, pp. 141-171.
17  U.S. Department of Defense, Nuclear Posture Re-
view, Washington, DC, April 9, 2010, p. 30, http://
www.defense.gov/npr/docs/2010%20Nuclear%20
Posture%20Review%20Report.pdf
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This article summarizes some of the 
findings and recommendations of the 
doctoral dissertation of the author as 
defended at Leiden University on 4 
November 2014. 
The dissertation asked the question 
of how to further the use and use-
fulness of diplomatic negotiation in 
order to limit destructive tendencies 
in international politics. It presents 
insights that will hopefully help to 
evaluate these processes as an 
instrument in dealing with contra-
dictions among the parties that are 
shaping world affairs: parties with 
both individual and common interests 
sitting around tables that separate 
and connect them. 
Diplomatic negotiation is between 
cooperation and competition. It is 
vital for the future to enhance the 
cooperative element in negotiation 
and to diminish the competitive side. 
However, politics are characterized 
by strife and competition is not only 
there to stay, it has the healthy func-
tion of avoiding monopolization as 
well. Looking at diplomatic negotia-
tion as a global system, as a pathway 
to govern the world and its inhabit-
ants, it seems sensible to strengthen 
it without suffocation. Striving for 
balance between context and pro-
cess through further regime-building, 
while keeping the arteries of the 
process as open as possible, might 
be of help in providing the world with 
reasonably good state and inter-state 
governance. 
The main proposition of the thesis, 
that international/diplomatic negotia-
tion can only be a viable alternative 
for warfare if countries can exercise 
a certain amount of control over 
their internal and external opponents 
through regime-building, has been 
discussed and analyzed throughout 
the manuscript: first in Part I on 
Nature; and second in Part II on 
Conduct. The focal point in the first 
part was the connection between 
process and context, the balance be-
tween war and words, and the quite 
recent phenomenon of more violent 
conflicts being decided through ne-
gotiations than through victories. The 
second part focused on the question 
of to what extent the cases signalled 
a more stringent control through 
rules and regulations, networks and 
constructions.
The analysis of the Westphalia 
Conferences in the middle of the 
seventeenth century showed that 
rulers legitimized foreign interven-
tion in order to keep the peace in 
the Holy Roman Empire of German 
nations. The treatise on the Utrecht 
Peace Negotiations at the start of the 
eighteenth century indicated the duty 
of the constituents to prevent future 
wars through unilateral or collective 
actions. The Congress of Vienna at 
the beginning of the nineteenth cen-
tury created a more or less perma-
nent alliance of the greater powers 
collectively to hold the peace. The 
Negotiations in Paris for the Versailles 
Treaty, early twentieth century,  tried 
to solve the problem of future threats 
of war by subduing the collective 
enemy for as long a time as possible. 
Finally the Decision Making System 
inside and outside Brussels, i.e. the 
European Union, managed to do 
away with internal wars by integrat-
ing a growing number of countries in 
one balanced construction through 
an international and supranational 
approach, thereby establishing a 
negotiation monopoly in the man-
agement of internal and external 
cooperation and competition.    
Outside and between these regimes, 
violence remains a problem. There 
is no negotiation monopoly because 
of the relative weakness of global 
institutions like the United Nations 
Security Council, although negotia-
tion has become a more important 
tool in conflict management and 
resolution over the centuries. On a 
regional scale, the progress of coop-
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eration – and thereby of negotiation 
– has been uneven. There has been 
a growing hope for regional institu-
tions to compensate for the lack of 
decisiveness on a global scale. For 
the moment, however, the European 
Union seems to be an enigma – an 
exception to the rule that regional or-
ganizations are hardly more effective 
than more encompassing regimes. 
States remain the domain of nego-
tiation, although they are enhanc-
ing their capacity for international 
negotiation as an alternative to war-
fare, because of growing economic 
interdependency, diplomatic insti-
tutionalization and the progress in 
international public law. The fabric of 
international cooperation, however, 
remains vulnerable and dependent 
on ripeness situations, as interna-
tional regimes are often still too 
weak to create negotiated ripeness. 
Negotiation has become a viable in-
strument of decision-making, but in 
crisis situations it is still often more of 
an auxiliary instrument. The turning 
point where diplomatic negotiation 
will be strong enough to make wars 
redundant is still to be reached and 
might never come, notwithstanding 
the growing strength of diplomatic 
negotiation over the centuries.
Diplomatic negotiations start with the 
actors who initiate the process. Ac-
tors have three choices: to do noth-
ing; to pull back; or to push forward. 
In other words, to freeze, to flee, 
or to fight. These movements are 
mainly determined by the factors in-
side and outside the context in which 
the actors operate. Inside or outside, 
three main factors play a role in the 
decision of actors to act: interests; 
values; and power. There are also 
three main phases in the negotiation 
process itself, as a consequence of 
these actions and factors: explora-
tion; selection; and decision. These 
phases are embedded in pre- and 
post-negotiation processes. As dip-
lomatic negotiation is an instrument 
in managing international relations 
in such a way that problems can be 
solved in peaceful ways, it will have to 
be effective as a tool in international 
governance and conflict resolution. 
By effectiveness, we mean managing 
actors, factors and processes in such 
a way that outcomes can be reached 
at the lowest possible costs. Manag-
ing sovereign countries is problem-
atic, unless – as has been stated 
above – there is a certain measure of 
control. This control can be exerted 
through over-arching international 
regimes. 
ACTORS
Since the seventeenth century, the 
state has developed into an ever-
stronger actor in diplomatic – that is, 
inter-state – negotiation processes. 
While in the seventeenth century 
the state was a tool in the hands of 
dynasties, with the exception of Eng-
land and the republics, it progressed 
to become an instrument in the hands 
of the people, represented by their 
parliaments. However, in more than 
half of the world’s nations today, the 
state is a de facto tool of oligarchic 
or authoritarian elites, while some – 
presidential – dynasties still govern. 
These internal differences have an 
impact on the two-level games in the 
negotiation process.
Public opinion plays a major role in 
democracies – and therefore parlia-
ment, the media, and public and 
private sectors – in the conduct and 
decision-making of negotiators. To 
sell negotiations to their own people 
is often a major – and unsolvable – 
problem. Negotiators from semi- and 
non-democratic countries will have to 
struggle less with their constituency, 
as they have more control over them. 
Control is thus a major element in 
dealing with internal pressure: the 
more control over the home front, the 
more effectively political negotiators 
and their agents can conduct their 
negotiation with external parties. 
This was dealt with in the chapter on 
negotiation and warfare. 
One of the findings of the thesis is 
that the creativity of the diplomatic 
negotiator is in danger, and thereby 
his effectiveness. Although the rulers 
were absolute in the seventeenth, 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, 
and in some cases also in the twenti-
eth and even now in the twenty-first 
century, the space for their agents 
– and thereby for their ability to 
reach outcomes in a creative and 
human way – has been shrinking. 
The ambassadors of the seventeenth 
and eighteenth century were thus in 
a way ‘Brusselized’ already. Nobles 
with common values using a lingua 
franca that they all understood, in an 
age when nationalism was not yet a 
serious issue, had more influence on 
the outcomes than their rulers, who 
mainly decided on the formulas, but 
hardly on the details. 
During the nineteenth century, rulers 
begin to intervene more and more in 
the day-to-day negotiation process-
es, while in the twentieth century, 
politicians started to play a more 
and more dominant role in the actual 
negotiation process. This develop-
ment was facilitated by increasingly 
effective means of transportation 
and communication. Political negotia-
tors can easily jump over the tables 
around which their agents try to fix 
the international problems of their 
countries, and these diplomats and 
civil servants can be scrutinized and 
controlled in a much more effective 
way than in the past. Furthermore, 
secrecy is an important element in 
successful negotiation, either direct 
or back-channel. In foregone ages, 
secrecy was much easier to uphold 
than either today or in the future. Bu-
reaucracies and intelligence agencies 
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can now penetrate the table. The 
media are much more effective than 
in the past, as democracy demands 
transparency, and transparency in 
turn is needed to establish and main-
tain legitimacy, at least in democratic 
countries. All this gives rise to a less 
effective diplomatic negotiation pro-
cess, thereby weakening negotiation 
as a tool in the conduct of interna-
tional relations. 
FACTORS
Interests are the dominant driver in 
international negotiation processes. 
Thus, situations of diverging and com-
mon interests are suitable for nego-
tiation processes. The more diverging 
the interests, the more competitive the 
actors will be. Conversely, the more 
common ground the actors share, the 
more cooperative behaviour we can 
expect. Intra-institutional negotiation 
will often provide a framework and 
a level playing-field where the clash 
of interests will be less harsh than 
in extra-institutional environments. 
The chances for assured and mutu-
ally beneficial outcomes will therefore 
be enhanced. As well as interests 
as such, the question of stakes and 
priorities will modify the weight of the 
interests.
One example of this can be found in 
a comparison of the negotiations in 
Münster, Utrecht, Vienna and Paris. In 
Münster the parties were so exhaust-
ed that this ripeness facilitated much 
common ground and thereby substan-
tial outcomes, which not only closed 
the past wars in an effective way, but 
also gave rise to new forward-looking 
regimes that are still relevant today. 
Utrecht, on the contrary, was a deal 
made by the victors and left many 
of the negotiating parties unsatis-
fied: the common ground was quite 
uncommon. As a consequence, new 
wars broke out and the conference 
was not much more than a pause 
between wars, although the peace 
agreement did settle issues and does 
have an effect that lingers on to the 
present day, albeit in a negative way. 
Issues remain painful for those that 
lost, such as Spain – Gibraltar remains 
a bone of contention. Meanwhile, 
Vienna showed common ground be-
cause of the existence of a common 
enemy: Napoleon Bonaparte and the 
French Revolution. The main reason 
why there was an agreement at all, 
and an agreement that more or less 
stabilized Europe, was a new regime 
that came shortly after Vienna: the 
Holy Alliance. Subsequently, Paris was 
the consequence of a victory by the al-
lies, not of ripeness for all the parties. 
The victors were exhausted and this 
forged common ground among them, 
but Germany remained outside the ef-
forts to create commonality between 
the parties. As a consequence, the 
excluded party took revenge 20 years 
later, something that had been fore-
seen by negotiators already towards 
the end of the Paris peace talks.
Values and norms are embedded in 
culture and culture’s impact on nego-
tiation is very diverse, but in general 
one can distinguish between societies 
in which negotiation is part of daily life 
and those where people tend to pay a 
fixed price. In the first type of society, 
the exploration phase will take much 
more time to conclude than in the 
second. However, in inter-state ne-
gotiation, negotiators from the latter 
type of negotiation culture are often 
much more willing to start a negotia-
tion process than those from the first 
type. This is because of the enormous 
importance of values and face-saving 
in the first type. The paradox is that 
while members of those cultures are 
more ready to bargain in the mar-
ketplace, they are at the same time 
much more hesitant to give in while 
operating at the diplomatic level. 
Values play a decisive role in inter-
national negotiation. Values are often 
overshadowed by the role of inter-
ests, but they can be as meaningful. 
In Western negotiation research, the 
emotional dimension has been under-
estimated for decades. Nevertheless, 
values are present in both ‘Western’ 
and ‘Eastern’ negotiation arenas. 
In the West, they take the form of, 
for example, the defence of human 
rights principles, the advocacy of 
good governance, and the promo-
tion of democracy. In the East, it is 
much more about reputation, pride 
and honour: face-saving. Negotiat-
ing about interests is more open to 
trading than bargaining about values. 
Values are non-negotiable (at least in 
principle) and can thereby be a ma-
jor obstacle to effective negotiation, 
especially if they are connected to 
personal or group identity. 
This was the topic of the chapter 
on reputation and ‘egotiation’. This 
chapter illustrated the importance 
of ‘face’, even in Western culture 
and even with ‘rational, purposeful 
politicians’. The point was made that 
issues of non-material interest could 
have very negative consequences 
for the negotiation processes, as 
with the cases of Chamberlain–Hit-
ler and Krushchev–Kennedy. The 
character and posture of the nego-
tiators had a positive effect in the 
Gorbachev–Reagan relationship. In 
the Stalin–Roosevelt–Churchill tri-
angle, things were of a more mixed 
nature, as was also the case with 
Nixon–Brezhnev–Mao. The role of 
‘egotiation’ was notable in the inter-
nal negotiating situations: the rivalry 
between Nixon and Kissinger; and 
between Mao and Zhou Enlai. These 
competitive relationships in a way 
posed more problems for reaching 
viable negotiation outcomes than 
the interactions with the external 
partners.  
The thesis furthermore found that 
in diplomatic negotiation, the role 
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and impact of power differences are 
probably the most important criteria 
for distinguishing diplomatic negotia-
tion from other kinds of negotiation 
processes. It is, in other words, the 
political aspect of inter-state nego-
tiation, as politics is about the use 
and distribution of power resources. 
Extra-institutional negotiations are 
more influenced by power differences 
than intra-institutional processes, 
and will therefore be much more 
risky than the latter. In other words, 
organizational structures around 
channels of negotiation will temper 
the impact of power, although power 
differences will not disappear com-
pletely and will materialize in the 
inclusion or exclusion of actors in the 
negotiation process. 
PROCESS
The phases in the process are very 
much influenced by their institutional 
and cultural context. The institutional 
environment has a huge impact on 
the way in which negotiations will de-
velop. Bilateral and multilateral nego-
tiations in international organizations 
provide for more security and thereby 
stability than ad-hoc bargaining. 
Outcomes will be more assured than 
in negotiations outside institutions, 
but the processes are normally quite 
time-consuming. The exploration 
phase can be short, as partners often 
know each other quite well, but the 
decision-making can be very painful, 
as actors are aware of the binding 
and often legal character of their de-
cision. The consequences are enor-
mous. The post-negotiation phase, 
moreover, is hardly problematic. 
The real problem of extra-institution-
al negotiation often lies in the pre- 
and post-negotiation phases: how 
to get the actors around the table; 
and how to ensure compliance and 
enforcement. To pressure negotia-
tors to come to the negotiation table 
remains the main problem. Context 
change is often needed, but it might 
only be the disaster that one wishes 
to avoid which can force parties to 
start the process. Mediators can be 
of great value, especially if they can 
be the source of a peaceful change of 
context through threats or diplomacy. 
As a consequence of insecurity and 
uncertainty, the exploration phase 
might become very time-consuming, 
while the selection and decision 
phases might be realized in a rela-
tively speedy way. 
CONTROL
An example of the role of control is 
the observations made in the chapter 
on simulated negotiation processes 
under the heading ‘synergies’, which 
discussed the problems that the chair 
will face in controlling negotiators in 
the meeting. Too much control will 
undermine the chair’s position, as 
the participants might revolt. Not 
enough control will hinder the chair 
in the task of coming to closure in a 
meaningful way. 
Control over diplomatic negotiations 
with other parties is the nucleus of 
inter-state negotiations, as it deter-
mines their outcomes. No control 
means unassured outcomes. Even 
if an outcome will be reached, its 
implementation is insecure. Incen-
tives for using negotiation as a tool in 
conflict management will thereby be 
weak. This enhances the chances for 
warfare as an alternative to a peace-
ful process of conflict resolution. 
The difficulty of reaching assured 
outcomes and implementation was 
one of the reasons for strength-
ening inter-state regimes during 
the last four centuries. Through 
these regimes, which culminated 
in international organizations in the 
twentieth century and supranational 
constructions today, sovereign states 
are managing their relations in such 
a way that less costly (that is, negoti-
ated) solutions will become a viable 
instrument in international relations. 
This opens opportunities for more 
international governance through ne-
gotiation in the future, with a grow-
ing importance for negotiation and 
how it will be conducted. Negotiation 
will therefore, in this vision, become 
an increasingly essential part of the 
conduct of internal and external 
negotiations.
As a downside, there is the danger of 
gridlock. While states are in need of 
increasing control over internal and 
external negotiation processes, they 
need more and more bureaucracy 
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to exert control. Bureaucracy and 
control tend to enhance inflexibility, 
which in turn hampers the negotiation 
process and thereby its effectiveness 
as an instrument. Bureaucratic barri-
ers will slow down the process, as we 
already see in the European Union. 
As discussed in the conclusion to 
the chapter on the European Union, 
such gridlock can be tempered by 
expanding the informal arena of EU 
negotiation. It has been noted before 
that progress in negotiations is often 
to be found ‘in the corridors’. In that 
sense, more informal talks will not 
only guarantee some freedom from 
institutional obstacles, but will also 
enhance the chances for successful 
closure of the negotiation processes. 
There is the importance of informality 
in reaching deals: too much formal-
ity leads to mechanical processes, 
while negotiation is not only about 
procedures, but very much about 
creativity. Nevertheless, a strong link 
with the formal side of the process 
has to remain, as control will other-
wise be lost and formalization of the 
outcomes will not be realized, thus 
making them redundant. 
There are also other trends dimin-
ishing the impact of negotiation on 
desired outcomes. As well as the 
growing role of the often ‘egotiat-
ing’ politicians, there are multitudes 
of national and international civil 
servants, lobbyists and other non-
governmental negotiators who are 
slowly but surely pushing aside the 
diplomat as an agent in negotiation. 
This obstructs the process in two 
ways: the sheer growth of actors 
creates more complexity; and al-
though complexity might open new 
options, it also serves to suffocate 
the processes. More complexity 
means more formal rules to manage 
it, and more time to come to closure.
Observations were made about 
the future role of the diplomat as 
a diplomatic negotiator in competi-
tion with negotiators of other gov-
ernmental and non-governmental 
agencies. It was observed that the 
distinction between diplomatic and 
non-diplomatic negotiators will prob-
ably wither away, foremost in strong 
regimes like the European Union. 
This is an interesting paradox: while 
the regimes allow for successful 
diplomatic negotiation processes, 
they will at the same time diminish 
the role and the importance of the 
diplomatic negotiators.
As a result, miscommunication will 
also be on the rise because of the 
erosion of diplomatic culture, as few-
er and fewer diplomats are allowed 
to conduct international negotiation 
processes. Professional cultures are 
bridges between societal cultures. It 
could thus indeed be helpful if nego-
tiators from specialized ministries sit 
around the table, as they do under-
stand each other, which would allow 
for a smoother negotiation process, 
but they will have to be hacked to-
gether for a final and balanced overall 
outcome. With a weakened role for 
the diplomatic services, whether EU 
or national, such harmonization will 
become increasingly difficult.
In sum, there are two trends for 
the future that will, depending on 
the situation, work against each 
other or strengthen each other. On 
the one hand, there is a growing 
institutionalization of the nego-
tiation process, underpinned by a 
multitude of negotiators facilitat-
ing these processes and thereby 
enhancing the chances for effective 
outcomes. This institutionaliza-
tion will result, on the other hand, 
in growing complexity, formality 
and transparency, thereby creat-
ing inflexibility in the negotiation 
process, which will obstruct it from 
reaching viable outcomes, as it is 
further complicated by complexities 
stemming from the nationalization 
of international negotiations and 
the internationalization of national 
negotiations. The processes will be 
more time-consuming, while in the 
modern world, timely closure is of 
the essence.
It is, of course, difficult to predict how 
much these two trends in diplomatic 
negotiation will neutralize each other. 
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However, as warfare is so damaging 
in our globalizing world, there seems 
to be no realistic alternative to nego-
tiation as a global tool in governance 
and conflict resolution. Negotiation is 
an essential component of the fabric 
of global governance. 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
In order to strengthen diplomatic 
negotiation as an instrument in 
international relations, a few rec-
ommendations might be of value. 
Diplomats and civil servants should 
continue to play different roles, 
whereby the diplomats’ role would 
have the helicopter’s view while 
specializing in certain niches such 
as conflict management. However, 
the formal difference between dip-
lomats and other civil servants 
working internationally should be 
diminished and – if possible – dis-
appear. It would be helpful to give 
both roles the same status and – 
more importantly – to forge a com-
mon culture. One of the tools to 
create such a common international 
negotiation culture is to provide 
diplomats and other civil servants 
with common education. With the 
teaching of international relations 
studies – whether political, legal, 
economical or otherwise – at uni-
versities all around the world, using 
English as the lingua franca in both 
education and negotiation, there 
seems to be no serious obstacle 
to the rise of an overarching new 
diplomatic culture in negotiation.  
This trend can be further stimulated 
through early and mid-career train-
ing of international negotiators 
through diplomatic academies. Since 
the 1970s, and for Europe since the 
1990s, diplomatic academies and 
schools of foreign service have met 
to discuss enhanced cooperation. 
However, notwithstanding several 
attempts to do better, little progress 
in cooperation has been made. The 
crux is the reform of the organization 
and the programme of these institu-
tions themselves, which can only be 
done, of course, by their respective 
governments. Little investment is 
needed to make this materialize. 
The organization of the forums 
facilitating negotiation processes 
could be made more efficient. Again, 
this would not demand serious in-
vestments in money and people, but 
there are serious constraints of a 
political nature. As long as countries 
feel that it is in their interests to 
cooperate, but that such coopera-
tion diminishes their options to opt 
out, thereby reducing defence of 
their vital national interests, such 
reorganization and streamlining will 
remain a Utopia, at least as far as 
top-level negotiations like in the 
United Nations Security Council are 
concerned. It is questionable, how-
ever, as to what extent these top 
institutions really count. 
Perhaps the underlying negotiation 
platforms are of much more im-
portance, as they prepare for the 
highest level strata. International 
negotiations will seldom start at 
the top. Day-to-day bargaining pro-
cesses by low-ranking and middle-
ranking negotiators will prepare the 
basis for negotiations at the higher 
bureaucratic and political levels. 
Without this preparatory work, the 
bureaucratic and political leaders 
would not be able to conclude their 
treaties. While it is difficult to reform 
the structures – and even more so 
the negotiation culture – at the high-
est levels, it seems to be possible at 
the working levels. 
Finally, the issue of internal ne-
gotiation processes should not be 
overlooked, as internal processes 
are often more important and more 
difficult to manage than external. 
Just as international politics is the 
reflection of national politics, it 
might be said that international 
negotiation is the projection of the 
national negotiation processes on 
regional and world politics. In order 
to enhance the effectiveness of 
negotiation as an instrument in in-
ternational politics, internal reforms 
are needed. On the one hand, this is 
easier than with external reforms, as 
there is more control over internal 
processes; on the other hand, how-
ever, these reforms will immediately 
affect the positions and interests of 
the bureaucracies and the political 
systems of a country or an interna-
tional organization. Enhancing the 
efficiency of negotiation internally is 
therefore problematic.
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As in the international arena, the bot-
tom–up approach might create more 
chances for success than a top–down 
approximation. The problem re-
mains, however, that the decisions to 
reform the institutions that facilitate 
the negotiation processes will have to 
be taken at the top, but they might 
be influenced in a positive way from 
the bottom. As crises are often help-
ful in changing a context, the current 
shortage of financial means might 
invoke more streamlining of – and 
cooperation between – the institu-
tions of the state or international 
organization. This might in turn help 
to simplify the negotiation process in 
order to keep it manageable.
Diplomatic negotiation will remain a 
country’s main instrument, both in-
side and outside international organi-
zations, for representing its interests 
and dealing with the problems that 
it encounters. Diplomatic negotiation 
will become more important as globali-
zation enhances interdependency and 
provokes regional and global conflicts. 
Interdependency is vital for negotia-
tion. Without it, diplomatic negotiation 
processes could not function. 
Government representatives navigate 
these processes in order to strength-
en national interests and/or to man-
age and solve conflictual situations. 
Whether chosen or self-appointed, 
the negotiators and their superiors 
manage the power that is mandated 
to them. In that sense they are elite, 
which automatically distances them 
from those they represent. 
Diplomatic negotiation is therefore 
an elitist affair and it is not easy for 
those who have been represented 
to be heard. As negotiation is about 
compromise and compensation, the 
interests of the constituency cannot, 
by definition, be fully materialized. 
Moreover, the representatives will 
push for their own interests, being 
those of their government, their 
international organization, or them-
selves and their caucus or clique.
Democratizing diplomatic negotiation 
is therefore hardly possible. Diplo-
matic negotiation is ultimately about 
an oligarchy deciding for those that 
it represents: about them, but only 
insufficiently on behalf of them. The 
negotiators are a ‘negoarchy’ of mu-
tual understanding, with a more or 
less common ‘negoculture’, as they 
could not be effective otherwise. 
By definition, their constituency will 
be unhappy with the processes and 
outcomes of diplomatic negotiation, 
while their governments might be 
suspicious of them in cases where 
they represent international regimes. 
As a consequence, governments 
will keep the international regimes 
as weak as possible, while these re-
gimes are needed to substitute trust 
for control in order to protect the 
diplomatic negotiation processes and 
their outcomes. The more diplomatic 
negotiation processes abound, the 
more complexity arises, the more 
regimes are needed to enhance their 
effectiveness, and the more govern-
ments will attempt to restrict the 
power of the regimes.
This is the Diplomatic Negotiation 
Loop, which will restrain mankind’s 
efforts to solve its problems in a 
peaceful way at a time when conflicts 
are multiplying and the use of force is 
inadequate and harmful for interna-
tional society. Construction and de-
struction go hand in hand. Diplomatic 
negotiation remains the most useful 
tool for dealing with it. Increasing 
our understanding of diplomatic 
negotiation processes will only serve 
to decrease misunderstandings and 
increase our effectiveness in settling 
future disputes successfully. 
This book can be freely
downloaded from
www.clingendael.nl/publications
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“How do negotiations end?” is a 
subject that had eluded any research 
attention.1 Yet is, after all, the basic 
question in the analysis and practice 
of negotiation.  The broader ques-
tion of how negotiated outcomes 
are determined is the underlying 
concern of negotiation analysis, and 
the question of negotiators’ behavior 
in obtaining closure focuses on the 
last lap in the race.  Closure is the 
point where Ikle’s (1964) three-fold 
option—Yes, No, Keep on Talking—is 
collapsed into the first two; talking 
will continue till the end, but is imme-
diately focused—like Oscar Wilde’s 
hanging—on the immediacy of yes or 
no.  This inquiry focuses on that final 
phase of the negotiations.  We posit 
that the situation at this point is that 
the conflict/problem and relevant 
proposals have been thoroughly aired 
in the negotiations: the preliminaries 
are out of the way, the negotiations 
have been going on for a while, the 
positions and interests have been 
made clear, everything is on the ta-
ble, and in principle there is a Zone of 
Possible Agreement (ZOPA) although 
that may be up to interpretation; if 
there is an agreement it will be less 
than the parties wanted but enough 
to justify a signature. At this point 
in the negotiations, can the process 
be brought to conclusion, and how? 
What behavior is typical and required 
to get the parties to Yes (to refer to 
the title of a book that does not focus 
on this point in the process)?  What 
variables are helpful in analyzing the 
situation?  Like the broader question, 
there are doubtless many answers, 
depending on the terms of analysis, 
although the search for a single con-
solidating answer that is meaningful 
is tempting.  Until one is devised, an-
swer to the question will have to be 
found in different analytical variables 
and approaches.
Two sister channels of inquiry may 
provide at least inspiration if not 
models.  There is growing attention to 
the When question at the other end 
of the negotiation process. Ripeness 
theory, and the associated attention 
to readiness, address the conditions 
necessary for negotiations to begin. 
It does not, however, look into the 
appropriate and customary behaviors 
associated with the situation. On the 
other hand, there is a good deal of 
attention to explanation of how wars 
end.  The subject is different enough 
so that the terms of analysis do not 
seem to offer much insight into the 
question of how negotiations end. 
A striking analysis (Faure 2013)  of 
why negotiations fail is closer to the 
closure problem, both substantively 
and in its organization: since failure 
is overdetermined, the study exam-
ines a number of cases for specific 
reasons of failure and then presents 
a dozen functional or disciplinary 
answers, each using its own term 
of analysis.  No common thread is 
sought, perhaps wisely.
Closure situations come in two 
types: negotiations that reach an 
agreement when Not Enough in 
comparison to original hopes and 
demand is still enough to make an 
agreement (Type I), and those that 
do not reach agreement because 
Enough was not enough (Type II). 
At what point do negotiators decide 
that an agreement, of any kind, is 
better and more important than 
waiting for an agreement on specific 
desires, terms or issues?  Conversely, 
at what point do negotiators decide 
that, despite an agreement on major 
issues, that agreement is outweighed 
by other considerations that make 
a successful outcome inappropri-
ate?  In the successful cases (Type 
I), the parties agreed even though 
they did not reach their stated goals 
or bottom lines; a partial agreement 
was deemed sufficient to provide a 
positive outcome.  In the unsuc-
cessful cases (Type II) the parties 
settled important issues but even 
that amount of agreement was not 
sufficient to warrant a final positive 
outcome.  Under what conditions do 
parties agree to agree on what they 
have and under what conditions is 
the progress insufficient to constitute 
the basis for an agreement? Above 
all, what kinds of behaviors are char-
acteristic of each type?  
Obviously the situations are on a 
spectrum, with extremes at either 
end.  There may be situations where 
both parties have gotten all they 
came for; it is assumed that such 
situations are rare and, for present 
purposes, uninteresting.  There may 
also be situations where there is no 
agreement on anything, the parties 
are not ready to negotiate, and they 
may be acting for side effects (time, 
publicity, reputation, etc).  These 
too are outside this inquiry.  But the 
assumption is that in the big grey 
area in the middle are most cases of 
negotiation, where the parties do not 
get everything they want or thought 
they deserved, where red lines are 
breached in spots, and yet they 
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1  With the one exception of the penultimate chapter 
in Fred Charles Iklé’s How Nations Negotiate, which 
however concentrates mainly on behavior  in the 
main part of the process..
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sense that the/an end is near and 
attainable, where the rising question, 
as the end approaches, is whether 
there is enough to constitute an 
agreement and how do the parties 
behave to attain it?  Should one 
continue to negotiate to try to get 
more, would pushing further push 
agreement out of reach, is there just 
or not quite enough to make for a 
positive outcome?
A complicating problem is that while 
analysts know how far the parties are 
from a conclusion because it has hap-
pened, negotiators do not, because 
they are only trying to establish that 
point.  Nonetheless, closure behavior 
concerns how parties act when that 
point comes into view, however 
dimly, as they are trying to establish 
and reach it.  How do they act in try-
ing to make it so?  We are not (yet) 
asking the prescriptive question, How 
should they behave or where should 
the outcome lie, but rather, How do 
parties act in such circumstances.
Behavior in such moments can be 
identified in standard negotiations 
terms.  One set comprises the three 
agreement devices: concession, com-
pensation, and construction (Zartman 
2009).  What type of concession 
behavior (moving toward each other’s 
position on the same item) is typical 
toward the end—large, small, split the 
difference, unilateral?  Does the previ-
ous concession rate change (Cross 
1969)?   Negotiation has been likened 
to two linked servomechanisms de-
signed to gradually move into focus in 
their aims (Coddington 1970).  How 
do they do this? Concessions have 
three functions—to alter own posi-
tion, to signal willingness to other, to 
attract other to own preferred point 
of agreement; how are these used? 
Are new compensations (trade-offs 
or exchanges on different items) 
being introduced?  Is there a shift 
from concession to compensation?  Is 
construction (reframing) introduced 
for the whole negotiation or for a seg-
ment of it?  Who adopts these behav-
iors, one-sided or reciprocally? Other 
terms for the analysis of negotiating 
behavior could be used.
Three analytical contexts bring these 
devices together.  One setting is a 
game of security points (BATNAs). 
Negotiators continually ask them-
selves (or at least they should), What 
happens if there is no agreement? 
This is an intrapersonal question 
asked in the large and in the small. 
The comparison point is one’s own 
level of acceptability.  In the large, 
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it refers to the whole complex of 
negotiations; if negotiations break 
down totally, does the situation go 
back to war/conflict and how bear-
able or desirable is this outcome? 
Does a breakdown of negotiations 
means that they are irretrievable, 
are component elements all lost 
(“Nothing is agreed until everything 
is agreed”), can the parties pick up 
where they left off?  In the small, it 
does not seem likely that the same 
question would apply to every issue 
and negotiating point, concerning 
whether the particular issue can be 
decided bi/multilaterally.  Thus, the 
security point question would seem 
to apply to the sum of the whole im-
pending agreement rather than to its 
individual parts and would be of little 
help in the individual decision-shap-
ing process.   While one is unlikely 
to find a favorable BATNA to specific 
questions, one can ask whether one’s 
side is better off with no agreement, 
all things considered, and use that as 
a guideline for specific decisions. The 
other context is a game of chicken, or 
rather a game of a flock of chickens. 
This is an interpersonal question, on 
whether the other side is likely to 
blink first, first on the specific issue 
and then on the balance of the whole 
agreement as it is shaping up (Gold-
stein 2009). 
The third setting is a game of ech-
oes, sensing how particular moves 
and then the whole outcome will 
ring back home in face of opposition 
and outright spoilers.  The referent 
group may be internal, including the 
decision-makers who mandate the 
negotiators.  Or it can be the larger 
body politic, including the opposition 
and voting public, as well as other 
bent on destroying the negotiating 
party and an agreement, believing 
to be better off without than with 
any agreement (comparative security 
points).  These elements of negoti-
ating behavior and its determinants 
can be used to frame the analysis of 
behavior toward closure.
CASES OF CLOSURE
These questions are real.  This inquiry 
is particularly relevant to the current 
negotiations between the P5+1 
and Iran over nuclear disarmament 
[Perkovich] ].  Since total and im-
mediate withdrawal of sanctions, and 
total elimination of enrichment ca-
pabilities are unlikely to be attained, 
how much of each is necessary for 
an agreement; what is the threshold 
of acceptability for each and how is it 
decided?  A similar question is bedev-
iling the peace process between Co-
lombia and the FARC, and also ELN, 
particularly in regard to accountabil-
ity and transitional justice [Rettberg/
Nasi].  On the Israeli-Gazan cease-
fire agreement of 2008, 2012 and 
2014, the question arose each time 
whether enough of an agreement 
–an exchange of promises on what 
not to do—was reached to constitute 
the basis for a ceasefire [Gunning]. 
On the domestic scene, the question 
is characteristic of collective bargain-
ing, moving down to the very details 
of the items discussed, where How 
much is enough makes or breaks the 
agreement [Anstey]. The question 
took a different form in a number of 
other cases, where a major item was 
considered at some level and agreed 
to be left out for fear of derailing the 
other items on which agreement was 
in sight.  The matter of Palestinian 
autonomy at Camp David in 1975, the 
Kosovo question at Dayton in 1995, 
the subject of internal settlement in 
Angola and Namibia in 1986, and the 
issue of Jerusalem at Oslo in 1993 
were all major issues among these 
settled in these negotiation but were 
left out in the settlement, as the straw 
that would have broken the agree-
ment’s back [Vukovic]. How was it 
decided to drop these and move to 
agreement on the other issues?
Negative instances or Type II nego-
tiations also abound. Closure is the 
name of the history of Israeli-Arab 
negotiations: once the inhibitions 
against any talks at all (the 1968 
Three Nos) had been overcome, in 
1973, negotiation proceeded on the 
return of Arab land to Egypt and 
Syria and peace treaties with Egypt 
and Jordan.  But the closer the with-
drawals came to the Palestine terri-
tory, the more difficult they became: 
when the ultimate goal of the Peace 
Process came into sight, it moved 
further and further away. Over the 
past half century, Greek-Turkish and 
Cypriot negotiations over the fate of 
Cyprus seem to be marked by one 
side—usually Greece—asking for a 
little bit more and thereby collapsing 
the agreement.  Negotiations at Aru-
sha over the opening up of the regime 
in Rwanda in 1993 doggedly pursued 
the wrong problem, as the Tutsi ex-
iles and the genocidaires faced each 
other.  In negotiating a friendship 
treaty, the French and Algerian were 
never able to come to satisfaction 
on the deep scars that they had to 
overcome (much like the Americans 
and Iranians) where the French and 
Germans were able to come to clo-
sure on a similar history of wounds 
[Rosoux].  Closure is a major issue in 
Chinese-Western business negotia-
tions, where the relation is the key 
and the agreement itself is incidental 
and epiphenomenal [Faure].  Finally 
in this list of examples are the ”Never 
Ending Multilaterals” in the world con-
gresses on major global issues where 
ambiguity, postponements, deadlines 
and lowest common denominator 
are keys to closure [Albin/Crump]. 
These well-known examples out of 
a potentially endless list are given 
to illustrate the nature of the subject 
and the different forms it can take. 
A study and comparison of cases can 
be used to draw out inductive insights 
for further distilling into more gener-
ally applicable propositions.
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CAUSES OF CLOSURE
In a search for an understanding of 
closure behavior, at least three con-
cepts seem to be able to contribute 
to analysis:  approach-avoidance, 
turning points, and unclaimed gains. 
The first says that as parties come 
close to the final issue (substance) 
or the final agreement (procedure), 
progress becomes more and more 
difficult; the goal to which they 
had been working seems less and 
less acceptable as it is approached, 
in what might be called asymptotic 
bargaining [Pruitt].  But before the 
last hurdle which appears bigger and 
bigger as one approaches it, negotia-
tors sometimes take stock of where 
they are and where they want to be, 
weighing these values against the 
fearful hurdle, and decide to go for it. 
As contrasted with the Israeli-Arab 
(Palestinian) negotiations, mentioned 
above, one might consider the 1992 
All-White referendum authorizing 
deKlerk to move ahead to Memo of 
Understanding and then to the final 
agreement on South Africa.  What 
type of behavior is associated with 
either reaction, and how do nego-
tiation leap the avoidance barrier to 
move on to agreement? 
Turning points are stocktaking mo-
ments when negotiators break off, 
consider where they are and what 
is ahead, and then decide either to 
return to complete the negotiation or 
give it up (Druckman 1988)[Druck-
man].  But this does not tell when, 
toward the expected end of the pro-
cess, the final turning point occurs 
and what kind of calculations go into 
the decision to return and pursue 
the bargaining or call it off in the 
estimate that it can go no further.  It 
is clear that what is involved is more 
than a cost/benefit tally sheet but 
also an estimate of the chances of 
making progress if on returns.  Simi-
larly, much has been made of the fact 
that parties tend to leave unrealized 
gains on the table, and the concept 
opens up many good questions. 
Does closure occur when unassigned 
gains are still on the table, avoiding 
contentious questions, or is it fa-
cilitated by emptying the theoretical 
basket of gains and distributing them 
[Thompson?]?  Do parties close—
sign or break off—leaving potential 
gains on the table and why, missing 
potential gains from the agreement 
either way, or do they clear the table 
and under what conditions?  Again, 
a simple cost/benefit calculation is 
not sufficient: Are the decision made 
out of ignorance (why?), out of 
some preconceived blockage against 
pursuing unclaimed gains (why and 
within what limits?),  or out of 
a calculation that claiming more 
benefits might upset the balance of 
mutual cost/benefit calculations?
The latter set of questions enters into 
another area of conceptual inquiry, 
the matter of information. Analysts 
have claimed that much behavior can 
be explained by the effects of infor-
mation availability [Kydd].  In the case 
of closure, what is the effect of full or 
limited information, and can informa-
tion be manipulated so as to provoke 
either break-off or completion?  Can a 
party use its control over information 
to draw the other party to closure on 
its terms? Again the analysis needs 
to go beyond tally sheets, since the 
whole claim is that tally sheets are 
ignored, or are manipulated for ef-
fect.  We know that in the beginning, 
negotiators withhold information on 
their offers and demands, as is logi-
cal for them to do ; are there similar 
guidelines for the use of information 
to produce closure, at a particular 
point, or avoid it?
A related area of inquiry goes back to 
timing, again referring to its use as in 
the matter of information [Svenson]. 
Information refers to material that a 
party controls and can manipulate; 
timing refers to external information 
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that parties can seize on and take 
advantage of.  More specifically, it 
concerns the way that procedural 
information can be used to produce 
a procedural outcome, closure, and 
with what substantive impact, on the 
content of the agreement?  Timing 
after all is the whole sense of closure 
question: why sign now?  One such 
item is sequencing, in its sharpest 
form whether the Big Issue should 
be taken early or saved for last, both 
choices about which logical argu-
ments can be made.  Or, stretching 
the notion of “last,” under what con-
ditions can closure be obtained only 
leaving the Big Issue or some other 
aspects of the conflict out entirely or 
postponed until later, at what price? 
Another aspect of timing refers to the 
components of ripeness: progress 
is negotiation is made by a con-
tinuation of the pressure of a mutual 
hurting stalemate (push factor) and 
the building attraction of a mutually 
enticing opportunity (pull factor). 
The two have at least side effects 
that can undermine each other: too 
much push can distract the pull and 
too much pull can find itself footless 
without a push to compare.  How is 
the balance maintained to produce 
closure?  Translating these ele-
ments into positions, closure is the 
point where hard positions and rigid 
redlines will have to be maintained 
to produce movement but softened 
to produce agreement, and flexible 
positions will have to be solidified 
on an agreeable position.  These 
criteria are contradictory enough to 
be of no insight,  so how can they 
be reconciled?  A more mechanical 
aspect of timing concerns the use of 
deadlines.  Under certain conditions, 
deadlines are known to facilitate 
agreement, but they may facilitate a 
meaningless agreement.  How much 
can they impose substantive agree-
ment and how much is it a matter of 
simply procedural agreement to sign 
anything in order to have signed and 
satisfy the source of the deadlines, 
often producing Lowest Common 
Denominator (LCD) or framework 
agreements?  In addition to usu-
ally understanding of deadline as 
an externally imposed cut-off date, 
deadline can also be imposed by the 
evolution of the conflict: It’s now or 
never.  A specific form of closure in 
such conditions could be to work 
for conflict management (truce, 
ceasefire) father than the more 
complicated conflict resolution, leav-
ing time under better conditions of 
suspended violence to work for a 
solution to the problem.
The key to closure may also be 
found in the parties themselves, 
more relevantly the referent body 
or bodies behind the actual negotia-
tors.  The line-up of sides within the 
home group can change to produce 
an end—positive or negative—to the 
negotiations.  The focus here is on 
the array of parties one step back 
from the negotiations, ad it can 
cut across some of the other ap-
proaches mentioned above.  In the 
U-Vietnam negotiations, one of more 
members of the Vietcong Executive 
Committee switched to approval of 
an agreement with the US (Zartman 
1978). Or the referent group may 
be the domestic audience, as in the 
discussions of two-level negotia-
tions (Evans).  In these views, the 
explanation of closure depends on 
managing relations within the ref-
erent or domestic group behind or 
underneath the negotiations.  From 
there, however, the matter goes 
back to some of the angles indicated 
above.
ANALYSIS
A number of diverse paths of 
analysis have been indicated.  They 
often cut across each other; others 
run parallel as simply alternative 
analytical tracks.  Are there common 
threads, one or several leitmotifs? 
The one(s) currently available do 
not lead very far beyond description, 
useful and necessary though that 
is. All approaches point to a cost/
benefit calculation, within different 
contexts and dynamics.  Beyond 
such cold “realist” calculations lie 
all sorts of psychological, historical, 
strategic, processual calculation of 
the value of agreement now com-
pared with BATNAs and opportunity 
costs.  Even if this is the basic calcu-
lation, it does not tell how the par-
ties behave before that choice and 
what determines their behavior.  At 
best these various contexts are only 
contexts, that is, they can provide 
a somewhat overarching analytical 
framework for the other concep-
tual lines of inquiry, such as turning 
points, approach avoidance, timing, 
etc., and even a propositional set-
ting, but scarcely a guideline for 
hypotheses (conditional proposi-
tions) on how negotiators behave as 
they approach closure and why.  For 
the moment, such propositions and 
hypotheses will await the inspiration 
and insight of inductive case studies.
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The Clingendael Institute sees the need for negotiation training 
support as part of the larger international conflict resolution 
toolkit and has therefore, with the support of the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands, taken the initiative to provide 
negotiation training for:
 1   Representatives of groups in conflict
 2   Mediators
The goal of the initiative is to strengthen the capabilities  
of participants in peace and mediation processes. To do so,  
Clingendael aims:
•   To enhance the quality and competences of mediators  
and representatives of groups in conflict taking part in  
negotiation processes;
•   To contribute to conflict resolution capacities locally  
and regionally;
•   To support peace initiatives of international and regional  
organisations.
The Clingendael Institute cooperates with international organisa-
tions  
and partner institutions to identify groups in conflict in need and 
demand of training, thereby increasing the chances for peace  
and complementing existing efforts. This means that the training 
courses are: 
Demand driven 
•   In order to contribute to conflict resolution where it is most 
relevant and needed, the courses will be provided to represen-
tatives and mediators in need of and willing to receive training 
as identified by international organisations;
Flexible
•   Clingendael has the capacity and flexibility to quickly respond 
to specific training requests from mediators, parties in a 
conflict and international and regional organisations involved 
in a peace process;
Tailor-made
•   The training needs will determine the type and focus of each 
course, taking into account the different stakeholders, topics 
under discussion and regional context. The timing, length and 
location of the training will be determined depending on the 
needs.
NEGOTIATION 
TRAINING 
AS A CONFLICT 
RESOLUTION 
INSTRUMENT
During peace talks, success and failure  
at the negotiation table are largely  
determined by the negotiation skills of  
the representatives of conflicting groups  
or the facilitation skills and expertise of  
the mediator. Yet in conflict resolution  
the importance of the stakeholders’  
negotiation and mediation capacity in  
achieving a successful outcome is often 
underestimated. Enhancing the  
negotiation skills and knowledge of  
parties involved in peace processes can 
greatly increase the chances of success.
The PIN Program looks forward to a number of international Roadshows and Work 
Shops over the rest of the year. 
A PIN Panel at the International Studies Association (ISA) organized by Mikhail Troitskiy on the theme 
of Overcoming Negotiation Blockages was held on Ash Wednesday, the morning after New Orleans’ famed Mardi 
Gras, where the ISA annual convention was held.  The program comprised a paper by PIN members I. William 
Zartman (Johns Hopkins University), with Pamela Chasek  (Manhattan College) and Lynn Wagner (Johns Hopkins 
University) on “Overcoming Blockage in Climate Change Negotiations,” and Mikhail Troitskiy (MGIMO) on “A Model 
of Negotiation in a Stealth Conflict: U.S.-Russia Dispute over Ukraine.” Sinisa Vukovic (Nijmegen University) also 
presented a paper on “Soft-power, Manipulation and Bias of Regional Organizations in International Mediation” 
and Shweta Singh (South Asian University) gave a presentation on  “Negotiating the ‘Intractable Kashmir’.”  
Considering the hour and the day, there was a good audience and discussion. 
The PIN Group will present a Roadshow on Mediation for the Toledo International Center for 
Peace (CITPAX) in Madrid on the subject of Mediation at the beginning of May. CITPAX and the Center for 
Economic and Social Science Research and Studies (CRESES) are designated as the academic bases of the 
Spanish-Moroccan Initiative for Mediation in the Mediterranean Region, and the PIN Roadshow will contribute to 
the effort.  PIN members report on various aspects of their research contributing to the study and practice  
of mediation.
The annual PIN Workshop will take place in conjunction with a PIN Roadshow at the 8th annual 
Montenegro Summer School for Young Diplomats ‘Gavro Vukovic’, attended by diplomats from over 40 
countries in early July in Cetinje, Montenegro.  The Workshop will be devoted  to launching the PIN 2015 Project 
on “How Negotiations End” (see accompanying PINPoints article), and the Roadshow will involve presentations 
on current advances in negotiation research and studies, with an accompanying simulation exercise. Cetinje was 
founded in 1482 as the royal capital of Montenegro, and long remained an independent diplomatic center in the 
Balkans.
A PIN Roadshow with special focus on the intercultural aspects of negotiation at the Peace Academy 
Rhineland Palatinate at the University of Landau, Germany, in early November.  The Roadshow will be held 
before an audience drawn from the university partners of the Upper Rhine Valley.   More details will be available 
as the program develops.
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